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Abstract
We examine the asymmetric and nonlinear nature of the cross- and intra-market linkages of
eleven EMU sovereign bond and CDS markets during 2006-2018. By adopting the excess
correlation concept of Bekaert et al. (2005) and the local Gaussian correlation approach
of Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013), we find that contagion phenomena occurred during
two major phases. The first, extends from late 2009 to mid 2011 and concerns the outright
contagion transmission from EMU South bond markets towards all European CDS markets.
The second, is during the revived fears of a Greek exit in November 2011 and is characterized
by contagion from (i) CDS spreads in the EMU South towards bond yields in the same
bloc and Belgium, and (ii) from Italian and Spanish CDS spreads towards all European
CDS spreads. Consistent with their “too big to bail out” status, Italy and Spain emerge as
pivotal for the evolution of sovereign credit risk across the Eurozone. Our examination of
the relevant mechanisms, highlights the importance of credit risk over liquidity risk, and the
containment effect of the naked CDS ban.
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“Contagion occurs when cross-country correlations increase during crisis times relative
to correlations during tranquil times”. —World Bank
1 Introduction
Contagion emerges in times of crisis and was a prominent feature of the European sovereign
debt crisis. Recent evidence suggests that negative shocks were diffused differently across
EMU (Economic and Monetary Union) member states (Claeys and Vasˇı`cek, 2014; Broto and
Pe´rez-Quiro´s, 2015; Caporin et al., 2018); countries with higher debt/deficits (Greece, Italy,
Ireland, Portugal, and Spain, henceforth GIIPS) were immediately affected, whereas the
direct impact on the rest of the European economies has appeared less severe.1 This issue
has revived the discussion on the transmission of shocks and contagion in the euro area,
which has led to ambiguous conclusions (see, e.g., Metiu, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Beirne and
Fratzscher, 2013; Blatt et al., 2015; Caporin et al., 2018). This paper considers all relevant
adverse financial and economic shocks stemming from the GIIPS during the Eurozone crisis
and analyse their impact on the intra-and cross-market linkages of the European sovereign
bonds and CDS markets. Having established that, we examine whether these linkages can
generate contagion. If the answer to the latter is yes, we also ask whether this contagion is
synchronous across different EMU countries.
Testing for contagion is not a straightforward exercise, as there is no broad consensus
on what exactly constitutes contagion.2 This study adopts the approach of Bekaert et al.
(2005), where contagion is defined as ’correlation between markets in excess of that implied
by economic fundamentals’. We complement this with a recent measure of local correlation,
introduced by Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013); this enables us to examine asymmetric
and nonlinear changes in the dependence structure and test for contagion effects transmitted
from the GIIPS to the entire Eurozone. We identify the dates where these effects occurred
and provide a timeline of all the events that triggered financial contagion during the Eurozone
1An additional classification of Eurozone countries is that between the EMU South (Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Portugal, Spain) and the EMU North (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands). Instead
of the terms “EMU South” and “EMU North” the terms “EMU periphery” and “EMU core” respectively are
also common. Throughout this paper these terms are used interchangeably.
2See King and Wadhwani (1990); Bekaert and Hodrick (1992);Forbes and Rigobon (2002); Bekaert et al.
(2005); reviews are provided by Pericoli and Sbracia (2003), Dungey et al. (2005) and more recently by Forbes
(2012).
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crisis. We also reveal the direction of this contagion and the counterparties affected.
The dataset includes 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads covering the period
from January 2006 to April 2018. In the first stage, our analysis employs a factor model,
where the bond and CDS data are conditioned on state variables (see Bekaert et al., 2005;
De Bruyckere et al., 2013; Fontana and Scheicher, 2016). These variables reflect the under-
lying fundamentals that drive sovereign bonds and CDS contracts. By controlling for them,
we avoid any issues associated with the bias correction for correlations and further exclude
any alternative explanations of our findings, such as those stemming from changes in the
underlying fundamentals (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
In the second stage, we employ the method of Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013) to
study the local Gaussian correlation dynamics of the filtered bond and CDS series. The
approach of Galeano and Weid (2014) is employed to detect endogenous break-points in
the correlation structure of our series and identify the dates of changes in their intra- and
cross-asset (inter)dependence. The next step is to estimate the local Gaussian correlation for
each country-pair around the break date and test for contagion effects via a bootstrap test
(see Støve et al., 2014). If the local correlation has increased significantly after the break
date, this is evidence of “pure contagion”, i.e., contagion over and above what one would
expect from economic fundamentals. The analysis is then replicated for our initial bond
and CDS data without employing the first-stage factor model. We compare the estimates
from the analysis of the fundamentals-filtered series with those from the analysis of the
unfiltered series to distinguish between cases of “pure contagion” and cases of contagion due
to changes in economic fundamentals (“wake-up call contagion”) or short-lived contagion
episodes (“limited contagion”).
Typically, during crises, the larger the shock, the stronger the correlations among finan-
cial asset prices (Veldkamp, 2006; Aloui et al., 2011). As Table 1 suggests, the Eurozone
crisis poses no exception: a number of negative shocks in different countries of the EMU
South caused a sharp rise in the bond yields and CDS spreads of the source country (in
bold). This rise is greater than the equivalent rise in the bond yields and CDS spreads of
the remaining countries. Most importantly, this was accompanied by a rise in the cross-
market correlations between changes in the source country’s bond yields and CDS spreads
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after the event. The degree of comovement in this period ranges between 0.50 and 0.75,
which indicates that sovereign bond and CDS markets do not respond uniformly to the same
shocks. This is in line with conventional knowledge that correlation between financial assets
becomes stronger as the market is going down and approaches one when the market crashes.
[Insert Table 1 about here.]
However, this one-number description is simplistic. Linear measures of dependence
work well for approximately bivariate Gaussian variables, but tend to have low power when
the dependence structure is nonlinear. Traditional tests that are based on rank correlation
statistics, namely Spearman’s rho and Kendall’s tau, are more robust against non-Gaussian
distributions, but do not generally capture non-monotone dependence. All these measures
are measures of global dependence. During economic downturns there may be subsets of
values exhibiting stronger dependence (positive or negative), while the dependence in other
subsets might be weaker. A proposed solution refers to the concept of conditional correla-
tion (see Longin and Solnik, 1998; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002; Hong et al., 2007), where
the ordinary product-moment correlation is computed for certain regions of the distribution.
However, the conditional correlation in a local region is not equal to the global correlation for
a pair of jointly Gaussian variables.3 Moreover, this approach produces a measure of linear
dependence locally, which is questionable in a nonlinear and non-Gaussian framework.
The approach we adopt is in conceptual proximity to the traditional correlation analy-
sis, but differs in several respects. The local Gaussian correlation does not suffer from the
bias problem of the conditional correlation (e.g., as in the exceedance correlation concept),
while the latter can be considered as a special case of the former. An additional challenge
stems from the fact that linkages are not equally strong between all markets (Kaminsky and
Reinhart, 2000). The effect of a shock on sovereign bond and CDSmarkets may be heteroge-
neous, varying with market conditions and the nature of the shock (e.g., a fiscal or financial
shock, a sovereign downgrade, etc.). The local Gaussian correlation can detect these non-
linear and asymmetric changes in the dependence structure (for a discussion, see Støve and
3This is known as the bias problem for the conditional correlation (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002) and
refers to the fact that in a Gaussian distribution, dependence is completely characterized by the correlation
coefficient.
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Tjøstheim, 2014). It provides a direct measure of both average and upper-lower tail depen-
dence that enhances our understanding of the interconnectedness between bonds and CDSs
in the different segments of the distribution. The latter includes extreme market conditions
(booming or crashing). Comparing the local correlation in the pre- and post-shock periods,
allows us to test for contagion with a bootstrap procedure.
Empirical tests of contagion require some prior assumptions regarding the potential trig-
gers. Thus far, these triggers were chosen exogenously and referred to country shocks that
caused a significant increase in cross-market correlations (see, e.g., King and Wadhwani,
1990; Baig and Goldfajn, 1998; Calvo and Mendoza, 2000; Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).4
Yet, these obvious shocks might not be suitable for identifying contagion: market volatility
usually increases in unstable periods, and therefore these correlations will be larger than in
stable periods and conclusions of contagion may be considered incorrect if synchronisation
in volatility is not considered as a contagion effect (see, e.g., Forbes and Rigobon, 2002;
Støve et al., 2014). Furthermore, since these shocks refer to crisis periods with extreme asset
price movements, this synchronization might not take place across the entire distribution; it
can further materialize over consecutive days and not only on the day of the given shock.
The local correlation measure captures changes of the correlation structure in the tails, the
parts reflecting these extreme price movements.
The identification scheme is based on the Galeano and Weid (2014) algorithm for cor-
relation change-point inference and can detect the number and position of multiple change
points in the correlation structure of our data series. By assuming that expectations and vari-
ances are constant and that there are sudden shifts in the correlations during the period of
the shock, this procedure identifies endogenously the number of the change points. These
points are then employed to split the sample into a pre- and a post- correlation break period
(endogenously) and on some a priori defined date. The consequent examination of contagion
is then bound to focus on points more probable to reflect these structural changes.
We expect the interaction between the two markets to be significant, since by construc-
tion, sovereign CDS contracts and the underlying government bonds offer investors a similar
exposure to the risk and return of sovereign debt. Their relative pricing is linked by a no-
4Such shocks include, inter alia, the 1987 US market crash, the 1994 Mexican devaluation, the 1997 Asian
crisis, the onset of the Eurozone crisis in October 2009.
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arbitrage condition: the CDS premium should be equal to the yield spread over a risk-free
benchmark on a par floating-rate bond (Duffie, 1999). Contingent on this theoretical equiv-
alence, traders try to exploit any short-term price differences between cash and synthetic
markets to make risk–free profits. In the long–run, the no–arbitrage relation guarantees that
the two markets are in equilibrium (for the euro area, see Palladini and Portes, 2011).
In the short–run, the two markets price credit risk differently to various degrees. These
short-term inefficiencies are mainly attributed to three general mechanisms: (i) maturity
transformation (see Diamond and Dybvig, 1983; Drechsler et al., 2018), (ii) herding behav-
ior (see Scharfstein and Stein, 1990), and (iii) leverage cycles (see Geanakoplos, 2009). For
example, any entity (sovereign in our case) that faces a maturity mismatch between its ex-
pected revenues and debt obligations, must roll over its debt periodically. If investors are
sufficiently pessimistic about its ability to refinance its debt, the sovereign may face a run
on its bonds and/or a buyout of the underlying CDS. CDS contracts serve this purpose, by
allowing pessimists to leverage without holding the underlying bond; this increases the cost
of borrowing and leads to a further increase in the sovereign’s CDS spreads and insolvency
risk (see Geanakoplos, 2009). The aforementioned mechanisms are expected to exacerbate
in periods of distress, such as those during the Eurozone crisis (owing to the herding behavior
of investors in the CDS market).
Our results indicate that contagion is neither a single-source nor a single-market phe-
nomenon in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis. In specific, “pure contagion”
phenomena in the sovereign bond and CDS markets have undergone two major phases. The
first, extends from late 2009 to mid 2011 and concerns the outright transmission of con-
tagion from the bond markets of the EMU South towards the CDS markets of both EMU
blocs. Most correlation break-points indicating contagion are concentrated around impor-
tant economic events. These include the Greek deficit’s upward revision in November 2009,
and the consequent fears about a possible Greek default, which ultimately led to the Greek
government’s official request of its first rescue plan in April 2010. Other events include the
agreements on the Irish and Portuguese rescue plans (November 2010 and April 2011 re-
spectively) and the negative economic developments in Italy and Spain (July-August 2011).
On the other hand, the European sovereign bond market appears immune to extreme
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negative developments in the periphery bond yields (a finding partly documented in Missio
and Watzka, 2011; Metiu, 2012; De Santis, 2012; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Claeys and
Vasˇı`cek, 2014; Caporin et al., 2018). This opposite responsiveness between the bond and
CDS markets with regards to the periphery bond-stemming contagion reveals an additional
difference between the two: the capacity of the bond market to reduce shocks and/or losses
within its context. This contrasts with the CDS market, where such shocks – reflected by the
higher yields in the periphery bonds – are preserved and possibly amplified. The analysis of
the unfiltered series reveals that European government bonds were rather subject to a “wake-
up call” during the late 2008-early 2009 period. This “wake-up call” prompted investors to
reassess the vulnerability of Eurozone countries, leading to a repricing of the factors that
affect sovereign bond pricing (Bekaert et al., 2014; Claeys and Vasˇı`cek, 2014).
The second phase, is around November 2011 and Greece’s plan to hold a referendum
on Eurozone membership. This prolonged political uncertainty has revived the fears of the
country’s Eurozone exit. During this period, CDS-bond contagion is mainly a “periphery”
phenomenon: contagion stems from the CDS markets of the EMU South and is directed
to the bonds of the same bloc and Belgium. When intra-CDS contagion is concerned, we
find evidence of outright contagion from the Italian and Spanish CDS markets towards the
CDS markets of both blocs. The outbreak of CDS-stemming contagion during the respective
period marks the development of the Greek debt crisis into a European debt crisis. In this
regard, Italy and Spain appear as key countries for the evolution of euro area sovereign credit
risk. This is consistent with their “too big to bail out” status, and the fears that a Greek default
would cause a domino effect across the Eurozone. The exposure of euro area CDS spreads
to Italian and Spanish CDS spreads stands in contrast to previous findings within the intra-
CDS context where contagion was found to be either non-existent (see Caporin et al., 2018)
or only a Eurozone periphery phenomenon (see Broto and Pe´rez-Quiro´s, 2015), and also to
arguments about the limited capacity of the periphery CDS markets to generate contagion
(see Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012).
We complement the above studies by offering an inclusive and detailed timeline of the
amount and direction of contagion within the European sovereign debt and credit markets,
where contagion is decomposed into its “pure” and “wake-up call” components. We show
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that the two Eurozone blocs were following a divergent path; the fiscal shocks across the
EMU South was the driving cause of such divergence. On the contrary, the notion that
contagion phenomena in the Eurozone were a consequence of the US financial meltdown
and the resulting global financial crisis is rather weak. The occurrence of the vast majority
of “pure contagion” episodes in the late 2009 – late 2011 period confirm these arguments.
Our contribution further concerns the identification of the increased sensitivity of the
CDSmarket to adverse economic shocks, especially in times of crisis. Contagion phenomena
ignite and consequently propagate to countries with similar macroeconomic fundamentals.
We thus highlight the prominence of sovereign CDS spreads in terms of price discovery and
contagion capacity relative to their bond counterparts.
Importantly, we identify the potential mechanisms responsible for the emergence of con-
tagion phenomena. As such, we focus on liquidity risk, which consisted an important deter-
minant of European sovereign bond yields during the Eurozone crisis (see Beber et al., 2009;
Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2009; Monfort and Renne, 2014). By distinguishing between
contagion transmission due to credit risk considerations and due to liquidity risk considera-
tions, we show that liquidity risk is an important source of risk in the European CDS market,
but only when stemming from the bond market. We thus content that credit risk is a stronger
determinant of price discovery and contagion transmission between the two markets relative
to liquidity risk.
On the same line, we further examine the role of arbitrage opportunities. Our findings
reveal that although arbitrage forces may be present (see Fontana and Scheicher, 2016; Gyn-
telberg et al., 2018), they were nevertheless unable to fully close the pricing gaps between the
two markets and affect contagion dynamics. We thus demonstrate that the different regimes
and adjustment speeds which characterize the correcting mechanisms between the sovereign
bond and CDS markets (evident in Gyntelberg et al., 2018), further restrict their contagion
capacity.
Last, our study is the first to link the important policy changes on the regulatory and the
monetary policy front during the Eurozone crisis with sovereign contagion dynamics. To this
end, we provide evidence that the voting of the naked CDS ban exerted a containment effect
on the transmission of CDS-bond contagion within the EMU South. We further consider
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the role of the ECB’s large-scale monetary policy interventions (in the form of government
bond purchases and one-off liquidity injections) and find no sign of bond contagion either
before or after their conduct; if anything, these interventions aimed at easing the periphery
countries’ borrowing costs and restoring monetary policy transmission, rather than targeting
Eurozone contagion.
The remaining of the paper is organised as follows: Sections 2 and 3 present the em-
pirical methodologies and Section 4 describes the dataset. Section 5 examines contagion
transmission from the sovereign bond and CDS markets of the EMU South, while Section 6
identifies the mechanisms and assesses the sensitivity of our findings. Section 7 concludes.
2 Contagion identification scheme and the factor model
The concept of contagion is not unequivocal and alternative empirical tests for it exist. An
intuitive starting point to measure a potential increase in interdependence could be looking
at simple correlations between two default risk indicators. Seminal papers have focused
on the cross-market correlations in stock markets before and after a financial shock (see,
for instance, King and Wadhwani, 1990; Baig and Goldfajn, 1998; Calvo and Mendoza,
2000). Yet, simple correlations during crisis periods could be misleading, as one would
expect higher correlations during periods of higher volatility (Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).
Conceptually, testing for contagion in our study imply the following five assumptions:
(i) contagion is triggered by an adverse shock, (ii) the transmission of the shock is different
from regular adjustments observed in tranquil times, (iii) the transmission of the shock differs
across the segments of the distribution, (iv) contagion is sequential: cross-market linkages
increase following a shock originated in the domestic sovereign bond or CDS market and (v)
contagion occurs over and above what one would expect from economic fundamentals.
The last criterion, which is mainly attributed to Bekaert et al. (2005), allows us to dif-
ferentiate between three contingencies. Assuming that bond and CDS spreads are adequate
credit risk proxies and that changes follow a linear or a nonlinear factor structure, increased
correlation between the two markets can be driven by three potential sources :
• an increase in the exposure of bond yields and/or CDS spreads to common factors,
which is labelled as “wake-up call contagion”. Practically, this occurs when there is evidence
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of increased local correlation on the unfiltered series (i.e., the fundamentals have not been
accounted for).5 The hypothesis of contagion between a given country-pair is verified when
examining the unfiltered series but rejected when employing the fundamentals-filtered series.
• an increase in the exposure of bond yields and/or CDS spreads to common factors,
which is further accompanied by an increase in the correlation across and/or between un-
explained bond yields and CDS spreads. This is labelled as “pure contagion” and occurs
when there is evidence of increased local correlation on both the unfiltered and the filtered
series (i.e., it exists over and above economic fundamentals). The hypothesis of contagion
is confirmed under both the unfiltered and the fundamentals-filtered series and this evidence
should be interpreted as evidence of “pure contagion”. Generally, such cases refer to po-
tent and persistent shocks, whose impact is not limited to economic fundamentals but goes
beyond them.
• an increase in the correlation across and/or between unexplained bond yields and CDS
spreads without a corresponding increase in the exposure of bond yields and/or CDS spreads
to common factors. This is labelled as “limited contagion” and occurs when there is evi-
dence of increased local correlation on the filtered series but not on the unfiltered ones. The
hypothesis of contagion for a given country or country-pair is confirmed by the estimation of
the fundamentals-filtered series but rejected by the estimation of the unfiltered series. This
form of contagion generally refers to short-lived shocks that quickly recede: due to their
magnitude they are reflected on the unexplained series, however their temporary nature is
not reflected on economic fundamentals.
To address these common risk factors, we follow De Bruyckere et al. (2013) and Fontana
and Scheicher (2016) and condition bond yields and CDS spreads on seven state variables.
More specifically, we use the three-month Euribor rate to proxy for the euro-wide risk-free
rate; we expect a negative relationship between risk-free rate and credit spreads (Merton,
1974). By subtracting the three-month Euribor rate from the ten-year Euro Swap rate, we
proxy for the slope of the term structure, since an increasing slope of the term structure
should, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in the expected future spot rate and to a decrease
5The results from this exercise are presented in the Appendix A.4. As in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we
have performed heteroscedasticity-filtering in the unfiltered series. If heteroscedasticity bias is ignored when
testing for changes in correlation, then contagion is over-accepted.
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in credit spreads through its effect on the drift of the asset value process. We expect the
relationship between the term spread and each of the sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads
to be negative.
To control for market-wide changes in business climate in each EMU country, we use
the idiosyncratic equity returns, defined as the difference between the national equity-index
returns and the benchmark Eurozone index return (STOXX Europe 600). We expect eq-
uity returns in a given country to be negatively related to that country’s credit spreads. We
calculate the idiosyncratic equity volatility as the annualized GARCH (1,1) volatility of id-
iosyncratic stock returns. We anticipate a positive relationship between idiosyncratic equity
volatility and credit spreads. To control for market-wide credit risk, we consider the iTraxx
Europe index, constructed as the equally weighted average of the 125 most liquid CDS series
in the European market. A higher iTraxx indicates a higher overall default risk in the econ-
omy, thus pointing to a positive relationship between this index and each of the sovereign
bond yields and CDS spreads (De Bruyckere et al., 2013).
Global risk factors constitute an additional driver of sovereign credit spreads, as higher
volatility is associated with higher economic uncertainty (Longstaff et al., 2011). To iso-
late bond yields and CDS spreads from the impact of euro area volatility, we consider the
implied volatility on the EuroStoxx 50, as reflected in the VSTOXX index. By deducting
a GARCH-based estimate of volatility from the VSTOXX index, we obtain a proxy for the
risk premium. The resulting variable measures the risk premium that investors in equity op-
tions require as compensation for bearing euro area equity market risk. This compensation
(risk-premium) should be a positive function of credit spreads. We further control for ex-
change rate uncertainty, by using the 30-day implied EURO/USD exchange rate volatility
index.6 In the event of higher uncertainty about the future path of the bilateral exchange
rate, USD-quoted protection should be more expensive than the equivalent euro-quoted pro-
tection. This is due to the currency hedge provided by the USD-quoted protection against a
potential sovereign default and a consequent euro depreciation; this indicates a positive cor-
relation between bilateral exchange rate volatility and CDS spreads (Fontana and Scheicher,
2016).
6The index is provided by the CBOE and follows the methodology of the VIX index.
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We collect all state variables from Datastream and the regression specification of the
factor model takes the following form:
∆Yit = c+∆β1Rft +∆β2Termt +∆b3RPt +∆β4ERVt +∆β5EqRit
+∆β6EqVit +∆β7iT raxxit + eit (1)
where ∆Yit is a vector representing the change in bond yield or in the CDS spread of a
country i at time t, ∆Rft is the change in the three-month Euribor rate, ∆Termt is the
change in the slope of the term structure, ∆RPt is the change in risk premium, ∆ERVt
is the change in the Euro/USD exchange rate volatility index, ∆EqRit is the change in
idiosyncratic equity returns, ∆EqVit is the change in idiosyncratic equity volatility and the
∆iT raxxit is the change in iTraxx Europe CDS index.
7
However, most of the covariates in the different regressions of Equation (1) have a low
explanatory power for our bond yield and CDS spread series. Fontana and Scheicher (2016),
use a similar set of explanatory variables to proxy the determinants of CDS premia and bond
spreads and obtain similar findings. Likewise, Groba et al. (2013) find that the explanatory
ability of local and global factors is not as high for euro area CDS premia. This, may be
attributed to the fact that the key drivers of sovereign credit risk have affected CDS premia
and bond spreads in a different way during the crisis (see Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
In line with these studies, we employ a large set of control variables at the daily level, that
theoretically should capture the time-varying effects of factors at the global, US, European,
and domestic level. Other approaches however, highlight the possibility that common factors
may change over time (see, e.g., Bekaert et al., 2014; Bekaert and Hoerova, 2016).8 To
confirm the stability of the parameters in our factor model, we perform a CUSUM test for
each of our bond yield and CDS spread series.9 Results from this test suggest parameter
7A battery of unit root tests for credit spreads and for the state variables expressed in levels, has not rejected
the unit root hypothesis. Therefore we estimate this equation in changes only. Results are omitted for reasons
of space but are available from the authors upon request.
8Bekaert et al. (2014) analyze the transmission of the 2007-09 crisis to 415 country-industry equity portfo-
lios in 55 countries. They employ a three-factor model, to distinguish between a US-specific factor, a global
financial factor and a domestic factor respectively. Bekaert and Hoerova (2016) employ techniques of time-
varying risk aversion and uncertainty for Germany and the US from January 1992 toMarch 2008. They find that
the variance premium contains a substantial amount of information regarding risk aversion in both countries,
while the credit spread primarily contains information about economic uncertainty.
9For brevity, the results of the CUSUM test are not presented here and are available upon request.
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stability for nearly all bond yields and CDS spreads in our sample; the only exception is the
Irish bond yields and CDS spreads in early 2011.10
The application of the bootstrap test for contagion necessitates the independence of each
variable over time. To satisfy this, one could employ volatility filtered series that pick up
any fat tails of the distribution. However, the use of standardized series may hide interesting
dynamics that affect the results. To address this, we initially estimate the factor model of
Equation (1) using OLS. Although this violates the assumption of independent and identical
observations, we are nevertheless interested to see the effect on the results.11 We subse-
quently estimate the factor model using a GARCH(1,1) model with normally distributed
errors; although this will not pick up any fat tails in the return distribution as the Student’s t
distribution, it will remove heteroscedasticity (see Table 8 in the Appendix A.3).12 By con-
trasting the two filtering methods, we observe that under OLS, the p-values (at the 5% level)
are on average lower than under GARCH, due to the expected volatility effects. Most im-
portantly, there is no difference in our conclusions about the presence of contagion between
the two methods at the 5% level. Since both methods provide identical results, we estimate
our factor model with OLS. We then employ the filtered series to examine changes in intra-
and cross- market dependence and test for contagion effects.
3 Methodology
Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013) introduce a new measure of nonlinear dependence inher-
ent to the concept of local correlation (cf. also Tera¨svirta et al., 2010). The central idea of
the new approach is to approximate an arbitrary bivariate return distribution by a family of
Gaussian bivariate distributions. At each point of the return distribution there is a Gaussian
distribution that approximates that point (approximate the density locally rather than the cor-
relation). The correlation of the approximating Gaussian distribution is taken as the local
correlation in that neighbourhood.13
10For the case of Ireland, we estimate the factor model of Equation (1) by including a dummy variable for
the respective period.
11In line with Støve et al. (2014), the filtering of the weight functions is wider. We experiment with different
weight functions, but all provide qualitatively similar results.
12Both Ljung-Box test and the LM test for conditional heteroscedasticity imply that the fitted models are
satisfactory.
13For the sake of brevity, a detailed description of the local Gaussian correlation procedure is provided in the
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3.1 A bootstrap test for contagion
This section presents a test for contagion that uses the measure of local Gaussian correla-
tion to examine whether cross-market linkages have increased (for more discussion and an
application in financial markets see, Støve et al., 2014). Contagion is confirmed if the local
correlation for the crisis period has increased significantly compared to that before the crisis.
The test was proposed by Støve et al. (2014) and is a bootstrap procedure.14
Denote Zt, t = 1, ..., T as the sovereign bond yields in country where the crisis started
and Xt, t = 1, ..., T the bond yields in another country. The data are filtered to remove time
and volatility dependence (see also Forbes and Rigobon, 2002).15 Let the standardised yields
be written as dt = (Xt, Zt). We then split the data in a pre-crisis period (NC) and a post-
crisis period (C).16 If the local correlation for the post-crisis period is significantly above the
pre-crisis one, contagion is confirmed. Fixed gridpoints (xi, zi) for i = 1, ..., n are used to
estimate the local correlations. Thus, the null and the alternative hypothesis can be written
as:
H0 : ρNC (xi, zi) = ρC (xi, zi) for i = 1, ..., n (no contagion)
H1 :
n∑
i=1
(ρC (xi, zi)− ρNC (xi, zi)) >0 (contagion)
The bootstrap works by drawing observations {d1, ..., dT} at random and replacing them
in {d∗1, ..., d
∗
t} . Next, this resample is divided in NC and C and ρˆ
∗
NC (xi, zi) and ρˆ
∗
C (xi, zi) is
computed on the grid (xi, zi) for i = 1, ..., n. The diagonal grid (xi = zi) is employed in the
subsequent analysis to minimize the computational time. The next step is to calculate:
D∗1 =
1
n
n∑
i=1
[ρˆ∗C (xi, xi)− ρˆ
∗
NC (xi, xi)]wi (xi, xi) ,
wherewi denotes a weight function that allows to concentrate on a certain region. The weight
function is chosen to minimize the distance between the gridpoints and the observations. In
other words, we avoid the estimation of local correlation in a gridpoint far away from any
observations. Repeated resampling allows us to compute D∗1 for these resamples and to
construct its distribution. Last, we calculate ρˆNC (xi, xi) , ρˆC (xi, xi) and D1 from the real
Appendix A.2.
14Similar ones are often used in a nonparametric setting, e.g., to for differences between quantities in non-
parametric regressions (see, for example, Hall and Hart, 1990; Vilar-Fernandez et al., 2007).
15In our empirical analysis an ARMA-GARCH(1,1) filter is used (see Section 3 for further details).
16Dungey et al. (2005), mention that tests of contagion can be affected by the predefined split of ‘crisis’ and
‘non-crisis’ periods. For this purpose, we use a number of alternative splits when we perform the bootstrap
tests for contagion; all these give quantitatively similar results and are available from the authors upon request.
13
filtered observations {d1, ..., dT}. The p-value in terms of the D
∗
1 distribution is found and
implies a rejection of H0 if it is below a chosen significant level α.
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4 Data and descriptive statistics
4.1 Bond yields and CDS spreads
The dataset consists of bond yields and CDS spreads for sovereign bonds and sovereign CDS
contracts with 5 years to maturity from January 2, 2006, to April 5, 2018.18 The sample
includes all EMU member states at the time of the introduction of the euro, i.e., Austria
(AT), Belgium (BE), Finland (FI), France (FR), Greece (GR), Germany (DE), Ireland (IE),
Italy (IT), the Netherlands (NL), Portugal (PT), and Spain (ES). The 5-year tenor constitutes
the most liquid and frequently quoted part of the credit curve and therefore, the most traded
maturity for CDS contracts. Daily bond yields are from Thomson Reuters Datastream and
daily CDS spreads are from Markit. We further convert the change in bond yields into basis
points (bps), due to the CDS spread changes (calculated as: ∆Yit = Yit − Yit−1) being
already in basis points. Daily frequency is employed given that the comovements in the
bond and CDS markets are not constant as investors shift their assets; in addition arbitrage
opportunities, which represent a significant driver (and consequence) of these comovements
are likely to be diminished at lower frequencies. Moreover, our examination period includes
some very tense periods and operating at a lower frequency would imply losing information.
In sensitivity analysis, we further use the bid-ask spreads (calculated as: ask price - bid
price) on the sovereign bonds and sovereign CDSs with 5-year maturity and the CDS-bond
basis for the same maturity from January 2 2006, to December 31, 2014.
Figure 1 (Panels A and C), graphs the EMU periphery bond yields, which have been
soaring since late-2009 and after mid-2010 when Greece reached an agreement with the Eu-
ropean Union (EU) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a e110 billion financing
package to recover from its debt crisis. Bond yields in the EMU core follow the opposite
17The authors would like to thank Dag Bjarne Tjøstheim and Ba˚rd Støve for providing the R codes for the
contagion bootstrap test.
18For Greece the sample ranges from January 2, 2006 to March 8, 2012 since the next day, on March 9, 2012,
after the agreement on sovereign-debt restructuring, the Greek bonds stopped trading. Data for Luxembourg
is available from February 2009 onwards, except for the period from January 2010 to February 2011, and
therefore is not included in the sample. The two-letter country codes that are used in abbreviation in our
analysis are taken from the International Standard for country codes (ISO 3166).
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course; they have been falling during the post-2008 period, with only a slight rise in the
first half of 2011, appearing to have benefited from the skyrocketing borrowing costs of the
periphery countries. As shown in Figure 1 (Panels B and D), CDS spreads in the periphery
match closely the upward trend of the periphery bond yields, pointing to a close association
between the two asset-markets. However, CDS spreads also increased in the core, indicating
an overall rise in sovereign default probabilities across the entire Eurozone.
[Insert Figure 1 about here.]
Table 2, presents descriptive statistics for daily changes in sovereign bond yields and
CDS spreads. The average bond yield change (standard deviation), expressed in basis points,
is -0.121 (4.54) for the core and 0.395 (17.87) for the periphery. Similarly, the mean CDS
spread change (standard deviation), is 0.005 (8.15) and 3.086 (137.2) for the core and periph-
ery respectively. Overall, GIIPS bond yields and CDS spreads are higher and more volatile
than their core counterparts.
[Insert Table 2 about here.]
5 Empirical results
We proceed to the examination of the degree of pair–wise conditional correlations between–
and across the European sovereign bond and CDS markets considering as source of conta-
gion each of the European periphery countries, namely Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and
Spain. We detect endogenous break dates on which contagion transmission is initiated by
using the algorithm for correlation change-point inference of Galeano and Weid (2014).19
This enables us to locate and identify a change in the correlation between the bond and
CDS markets and thus determine the exact date associated with a fundamental change in the
relationship between those markets. The identification of a structural change in the cross-
and intra-asset correlations further allows us to split the sample into a pre- and a post-event
period, or more properly into a pre- and post-contagion period.20 We then quantify the im-
19The Galeano and Weid (2014) methodology for the identification of structural changes in correlation is
given in Appendix A.1.
20The test results for detecting structural changes in correlation are presented in Appendix A.4.
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pact of the structural change by estimating the transmission of a shock to the bond and CDS
markets during the respective periods.
Consistent with our priors, we conduct the analysis by employing the bond and CDS data
after accounting for fundamentals via the factor model of Equation (1). However, we conduct
a similar analysis for the original bond and CDS data without the removal of fundamentals
(results from this exercise are presented in the Appendix A.5).21 By contrasting the results
from the two methods, we can differentiate between cases of “pure contagion” from cases
of “wake-up call contagion” and “limited contagion”. In this respect, if the hypothesis of
contagion between a given country-pair is verified by the estimation of unfiltered series but
rejected by the estimation of fundamentals-filtered series, this would serve as evidence of
“wake-up call contagion”. In contrast, findings of contagion under both the unfiltered and
fundamentals-filtered series should be interpreted as evidence of “pure contagion”. Last, if
contagion is verified by only the filtered series, this points to a short-lived episode of “limited
contagion”.
5.1 Transmission of contagion from the GIIPS bond markets to the
EMU bond and CDS markets
Table 3, presents the results on the transmission of contagion from the bonds of the EMU
South towards the bonds (Panel A) and CDSs (Panel B) in each of the eleven EMU member
states. When the analysis is concentrated solely within the bond market, estimates in Panel
A reveal that bonds yields across the Eurozone have been immune to contagion phenomena
during the pre- as well as post-financial crisis period; bootstrap test for contagion is not able
to reject the null hypothesis of no-contagion in practically all pairs (columns 1 to 5 in Panel
A). This absence of shift contagion stemming from the distressed countries of the European
periphery (also partly documented in Missio and Watzka, 2011; Metiu, 2012; De Santis,
2012; Beirne and Fratzscher, 2013; Claeys and Vasˇı`cek, 2014; Caporin et al., 2018) is not
necessarily a sign of widespread disassociation between the sovereign debt markets.22 It
can serve as (i) supporting evidence of the investors’ flight(s) away from the risky periphery
21As in Forbes and Rigobon (2002), we have performed heteroscedasticity-filtering in the unfiltered series.
If heteroscedasticity bias is ignored when testing for changes in correlation, then contagion is over-accepted.
22The aforementioned studies find no evidence of shift contagion across the European sovereign bond mar-
kets when the role of contagion originator is primarily assumed to be Greece.
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bonds to the safer core bonds and therefore of a negative correlation between bond yield
movements in the two blocs (see Beber et al., 2009) and (ii) an indication that the common
shifts of periphery government bond yields can be explained in terms of the – enduring–
interdependence between them.
[Insert Table 3 about here.]
This disassociation is not confirmed for the bond-CDS nexus: results in Panel B of Table
3, point to transmission of bond-originated contagion from all countries of the EMU South
to nearly all European countries. Most importantly, these results are derived from the anal-
ysis of the fundamentals-filtered series, therefore pointing to contagion over and above that
suggested by fundamentals (“pure contagion”). Interestingly, this transmission occurs over
a series of different phases, all of them coinciding with major economic and political events
during the late 2009-mid 2011 period.
The first phase is during November 2009, shortly after the upward revision of the Greek
government’s budget deficit: estimates in the first column of Panel B, indicate the trans-
mission of contagion from the Greek bond to each of the European CDS markets.23 The
Greek-bond stemming contagion does not appear to be a one-off phenomenon as it further
emerges in April 2010. The respective month is characterized by the growing fears about a
possible Greek default, which ultimately led to the Greek government’s official request for
the activation of the joint EU/IMF aid package.24
The next phase occurs in November 2010 and includes the transmission of contagion
from the Irish bond yields to almost all European CDS spreads (second column of Panel B).
This period marks the re-eruption of the Irish crisis (back from the 2008 banking crisis and
the e64 billion bailout of Irish banks) and resulted in a joint EU/IMF financial assistance
programme. The Irish government’s request for the programme was made on November 21,
2010, while on November 24, 2010 the government outlined e15 billion in spending cuts
23The Greek budget deficit was initially revised upward from 6.0% of GDP to 12.5% on October 19, 2009
by the new Greek minister of finance during his first Eurogroup meeting. In the budget draft for fiscal year
2010 that was submitted to the Hellenic Parliament for consideration in the November 5, 2009, the 2009 deficit
was revised to 12.7%, while in the final draft of November 16, 2009 (that was voted by the Parliament), the
budget was revised to 13.6%.
24On April 23rd, 2010, the Greek Prime Minister George Papandreou made a live broadcast announcement
from the Greek island of Kastelorizo, on the request of the e60 billion financial aid programme from the EU
and the IMF.
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and tax increases in order to reduce its budget deficit from 31% of GDP to 3% by 2014.
These were followed by massive rallies and protests in Dublin three days later, before the
e67.5 billion bailout package being accepted on November 28, 2010.25
The fourth and more intense phase of contagion occurred during the second and third
quarter of 2011. Starting from April 2011, the Portuguese government requested financial
assistance from the EU, which in early May was agreed to be provided jointly by the EU and
the IMF.26 According to estimates in the fourth column of Panel B, the period shortly before
the Portuguese request (late March 2011) until the final bailout agreement (early May 2011)
was characterized by the transmission of contagion from Portuguese bond yields to nearly
all EMU CDS spreads. Contagion phenomena were even more prevalent during the third
quarter of 2011. Results in the third and fifth column of Panel B, point to contagion from the
bond markets of Italy and Spain respectively towards each of the EMU CDS markets. Most
of the correlation break-dates that indicate contagion are observed between mid July and
early August of 2011, a period of significant turmoil in the Italian and Spanish economies.
In specific, on July 14, 2011, Italy raised e3 billion from selling government bonds,
albeit at a record interest rate of 5.9%. One day later, (July 15, 2011) the European Bank-
ing Authority (EBA) announced that five Spanish banks failed its “stress tests”, while seven
other Spanish banks barely passed.27 During the same period, talks abounded that Greece
would become the first country to be forced to exit the Eurozone. Indeed, a few breaking
points are observed on July 20, just one day before the agreement between EU and IMF for
a second EU/IMF bailout package totaling e109 billion. However, this agreement was not
able to contain speculations on a potential Greek default, which were echoed in the Euro-
pean Commission President’s warning that the sovereign debt crisis was spreading beyond
the Eurozone periphery. According to our findings, developments in Italy and Spain as well
as the continuing speculations about a looming Greek exit were diffused across the Euro-
25On November 21, 2010, the Irish Prime Minister Brian Cowen announced that Ireland has applied for aid
from the EU and IMF. On November 28, 2010, the Irish government accepted a e67.5 billion joint EU/IMF
bailout package.
26On April 6, 2011, the Portuguese Prime Minister Jose´ So´crates extended a request to the European Union
for a financial assistance programme. On May 6, 2011, the Portugal reached an agreement with the EU and the
IMF for a financial assistance programme of e78 billion.
27The banks that failed the EBA’s stress tests were Catalunya Caixa, Caja de Ahorros de Mediterraneo,
Banco Pastor, Unnim, and Group Caja3. Seven banks, i.e., Banco Sabadell, Banco Popular, and Bankinter and
the savings banks Novacaixagalicia, Caja Ontinyent, Banca Civica, and Bankia, just achieved the minimum
requirement of core equity Tier 1 (CET1) capital ratio of 5.0%.
18
zone CDS markets, via the rising Italian and Spanish sovereign bond yields. This period of
contagion transmission is further consistent with the onset of the upward trend in the Italian
and Spanish government bond yields, evidenced in Panel B of Figure 1.
We consequently contrast the results in Table 3 with the results from the unfiltered series
in Table 11 of the Appendix. Contrary to Panel A in Table 3, estimates in Panel B of Table
11 provide evidence of widespread contagion from each of the GIIPS bond markets to prac-
tically all European CDS markets. Since these findings are derived from the analysis of the
unfiltered series, but not confirmed from the analysis of the filtered ones, they point to a form
of “wake-up call contagion”. Importantly, most correlation change-dates fall within the late
2008-early 2009 period. Thus, we can infer that movements in the European sovereign bond
markets were part of the general repricing of sovereign credit risk after the global financial
crisis and during the evolution of the Eurozone crisis. Turning to Panel B in Table 11, we
observe that estimates exhibit only marginal deviations from those of Panel B in Table 3.
5.2 Transmission of contagion from the GIIPS CDS markets to the
EMU bond and CDS markets
Table 4, presents results when contagion is assumed to be stemming from the CDS market.
Estimates from the examination of the CDS-bond transmission in Panel A, reveal that con-
tagion phenomena are restricted only within the bounds of the EMU South and Belgium.
The majority of correlation change-points indicating contagion are observed during the third
quarter of 2011 and in particular November 2011. Initially, contagion appears to be stem-
ming from Greece in early November (column 1 in Panel A). The Greek CDS-stemming
contagion could be linked to the political developments in Greece during the respective pe-
riod, which had implications for the viability of the Eurozone itself. On October 31, 2011,
the Greek Prime Minister called for a referendum on the EU/IMF rescue plan for Greece
agreed only days earlier, which on November 2, 2011 was modified to be a referendum on
Greece’s Eurozone membership.28 Shortly after the referendum call, efforts for the forma-
tion of government of national unity in Greece temporarily collapsed (November 4, 2011),
28The rescue plan included a 50% debt write-off for private sector investors and e130bn of new bailout loans
to Greece. The initial referendum call on the proposed EU/IMF rescue plan was modified after pressures from
the French President Nicolas Sarkozy and the German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the G20 Cannes summit
of November 2, 2011. The call for referendum was abandoned on November 4, 2011.
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only to resume successfully seven days later.29
[Insert Table 4 about here.]
Our estimates reveal that this heightened period generated contagion transmission from
the Greek CDS spreads towards the periphery bond yields. Shortly after, contagion phenom-
ena further emerged from the rest of the periphery economies. Results in columns 2-5 of
Panel A show that the CDS markets of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain transmit conta-
gion to the bond markets in each country of the EMU South and Belgium. The dates of this
transmission are located in the days right after the formation of the Greek government unity.
Evidently, the political uncertainty in Greece sparked a contagion wave within the EMU
South. Most importantly, this transmission is not verified by the analysis of the unfiltered
series: most of the break dates surrounding the Greek developments of November 2011 do
not appear or enter with a non-significant sign (Panel A of Table 12 in the Appendix). This
in turn reveals that this was a short-lived episode of “limited contagion” owing to the abrupt
political uncertainty in Greece that shortly receded.
The analysis at the intra-CDS market level (see Panel B in Table 4), provides evidence
of contagion stemming from the EMU South’s biggest economies, i.e., Italy and Spain to
practically all European CDS markets. Estimates in columns 3 and 5 of Panel B, show that
contagion transmission took place over two phases: the first and more intense was during
November 2011, where Italian and Spanish CDS spreads directed contagion towards each
Eurozone country. These results complement those of Panel A in Table 4, where the same
period – and the accompanied political developments in Greece – were found responsible
for the transmission of CDS-stemming contagion to periphery bond markets. According to
our estimates, this period further establishes Italy and Spain as the absolute transmitters of
CDS contagion towards all European CDS markets. Indeed, during the respective period we
observe a surge in the CDS spreads of both EMU blocs (Panels C and D in Figure 1).
The second phase of this transmission is observed in the first weeks of 2012, the period
29On November 4, 2011, the leaders of the two largest political parties engaged in talks for the formation of
a government of national unity, but these talks collapsed within the same day. The following day, the Greek
Prime Minister George Papandreou resigned and succeeded by Lucas Papademos on November 11, 2011, who
led a new government of national unity.
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leading to the Greek debt restructuring of March 2012.30 Although contagion phenomena are
not as intense as in late 2011, they are still evident and mainly directed towards the largest
economies of the core (France, Germany, the Netherlands) and Belgium. Notwithstanding
their size, the increasing influence of Italian and Spanish CDSs can also be explained when
considering the nature of the CDS contracts. By construction, CDSs mainly reflect sovereign
credit risk. Hence, a possible default by either Italy and/or Spain could trigger domino effects
that could eventually lead to the collapse of the EMU. Panel B, shows that these concerns
and the consequent contagion transmission were more prevalent in late 2011 (primarily) and
early 2012 (secondarily). The exposure of European CDS markets to the Italian and Span-
ish CDS spreads stands in contrast to previous findings within the intra-CDS context, where
contagion was found to be either non-existent (see Caporin et al., 2018) or only a European
periphery phenomenon (see Broto and Pe´rez-Quiro´s, 2015), and to arguments about the lim-
ited capacity of the GIIPS to generate contagion (see Kalbaska and Gatkowski, 2012).
We further compare the results from the fundamentals-filtered series in Table 4 with those
from the unfiltered series in Table 12 of the Appendix. Panel A of Table 12, points to cer-
tain cases of CDS-bond contagion from the periphery (Italy, Portugal, Spain) towards the
core (Germany, Finland, France, the Netherlands) that are not evident in Panel A of Table 4.
As such, these cases, which are mainly concentrated in the second half of 2010, cannot be
classified as “pure contagion”. They can be rather perceived as a “wake-up call” for govern-
ment bond yields across the core and attributed to the investors’ upward repricing of those
countries’ fundamentals, prompted by the rising CDS spreads across the periphery. Last,
estimates from Panel B of Table 12, do not reveal additional cases of intra-CDS contagion
that are not consequently confirmed by the main estimations in Panel B of Table 4.
30On February 12, 2012, the Greek parliament voted in favour of a second bailout package for Greece to-
talling e130 billion. The parliamentary approval of this package was a prerequisite for the debt restructuring of
March that occurred between March and April 2012. Under the restructuring, the Greek government amended
the conditions of bonds under Greek law with a total face value of e177 billion. The restructuring included
the involvement of the private sector, whereby investors were required to accept a 53.5% haircut of the face
value of Greek government bonds. As a result, the nominal value of Greek debt was reduced by e107 billion,
approximately 50% of GDP. It constituted the world’s biggest debt restructuring, involving securities of e206
billion.
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5.3 Discussion
Our analysis identifies two key phases for the transmission of contagion within the European
sovereign financial market framework. The first extends from late 2009 to mid 2011 and is
characterized by the outright transmission of contagion from the bond markets of the EMU
South towards the CDS markets of all member states. Contagion phenomena emerge in the
periods corresponding to the Greek deficit’s upward revision (November 2009) and the fears
of a Greek default that culminated in the country’s first bailout package (April 2010), the
rescue programmes in Ireland and Portugal (November 2010 and April 2011 respectively)
and the negative economic developments in Italy and Spain (July-August 2011).
However, during these intense periods there is absence of bond-stemming contagion to-
wards any of the European government bonds whatsoever. The rising CDS spreads in both
the periphery and core during these periods (also evident in Panels C and D of Figure 1) in-
dicate that the negative developments in the periphery were only transmitted across the CDS
market. It therefore appears that the European sovereign bond and CDS markets differ with
regards to their capacity to preserve or amplify potential shocks occurring in the periphery.
The next phase is around November 2011, and includes Greece’s referendum announce-
ment and the prolonged political uncertainty that revived the fears of the country’s Eurozone
exit. In this period, we observe a) the emergence of CDS-bond contagion in the periphery,
and b) the transmission of contagion from the Italian and Spanish CDS spreads to either
blocs’ CDS spreads. The respective period marks the onset of the triggering capacity of the
CDS market; for the first time during our examination, rising sovereign default probabilities
are transmitted to the periphery bond yields as well as to both blocs’ CDS spreads. Evidently,
this is the critical point where the Greek debt crisis developed into a European debt crisis.
Our estimates further elevate Italy and Spain to key determinants of sovereign credit risk
across the Eurozone: Italian and Spanish CDS spreads are the only transmitters of contagion
to all countries’ CDS spreads. Importantly, this transmission mainly occurs during the late
2011-early 2012 period. In addition to speculations about a Greek Eurozone exit, this period
was also characterized by increasing market concerns over the economic outlook and debt
sustainability of Italy and Spain.31 Due to their economic size (third and fourth EMU econ-
31In Italy, the low rates of productivity and output growth were not keeping up with an increasing debt load
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omy respectively), both countries are considered too expensive for the EMU members to be
realistically bailed out. Only for Italy, where public debt stands at approximately e2 trillion
(the world’s fourth largest), a 3-year rescue support program was estimated by the IMF at
e600 billion. The European Financial Stability Fund evidently did not had enough funds to
accomplish such a task, thereby constituting either countries as too big to bail out. Hence,
the respective period reflected the fears that a Greek default would cause a domino effect,
causing Italy and Spain to fall as well, with resulting implications for Eurozone’s stability.
Interestingly, this heavy influence of the Italian and Spanish CDS markets appears to
ease after March 2012. According to our estimates, the presence of contagion phenomena
regardless of their source is rather limited thereafter. A potential explanation can be offered
by an important development in the beginning of 2012, namely the Greek debt restructuring
of March 9, 2012. This historical deal prevented a Greek default and demonstrated the EU’s
willingness to preserve the Eurozone. For what matters, this deal is associated with the
minimization of contagion phenomena across the Eurozone entering the second quarter of
2012, particularly those directed from the periphery CDS markets.
The analysis of the unfiltered series (Tables 11 and 12 of the Appendix), provides evi-
dence of a “wake-up call” in the European bond markets in late 2008-early 2009. This period
was marked by the spillovers of the financial crisis and the early seeds of the Eurozone crisis.
Either crises provided new information, prompting investors to reassess the vulnerability of
other countries, leading to a repricing of sovereign bond pricing factors (Bekaert et al., 2014;
Claeys and Vasˇı`cek, 2014). The consequent rise in GIIPS long-term government bond yields
was further fueled by recession and government announcements of bank rescue operations
that exacerbated investor perceptions of sovereign credit risk. This was reflected in the op-
posite evolution of government bond yields between the periphery and core (Monfort and
Renne, 2014; Fontana and Scheicher, 2016), a fact also evident in Panels A and B of Figure
1. The concentration of correlation break-dates in this period, indicates that these develop-
ments were priced by the bond markets, only to the extent that affected bond fundamentals.
of almost 120% of GDP, the second highest in the Eurozone, behind Greece. In Spain, the property bubble
eventually turned to bust, resulting in the country’s banks accumulating a mounting pile of bad mortgage debts,
and the highest unemployment rate in the Eurozone. Along these lines, Italy’s credit rating was decreased by
three notches in late 2010, while Spain’s credit rating was cut three times (one notch each time) from 2010 to
2011.
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6 Further analysis
Our results in the previous section show that the countries of the EMU South acted as trans-
mitters of contagion not only within their own country-bloc but most importantly, towards
the countries of the EMU North. Moreover, this transmission took place over two distinct
phases of the European sovereign debt crisis. Having established that, in this section we
perform a number of tests to further enlighten our findings, and the heterogeneity around
certain fiscal and regulatory events. The role of liquidity and basis deviations for contagion
transmission is also examined.
6.1 The developments in Greece
Estimates in section 5.1 pointed to a surge in contagion transmission from the Greek bond
yields to almost all European CDS spreads in the days surrounding two important events:
the November 2009 Greek upward deficit revision (primarily), and the April 2010 Greece’s
request for financial assistance (secondarily). Since these essentially marked the onset of
the Eurozone crisis, we examine the transmission of contagion from the Greek bonds to the
remaining ten EMU CDSs in the different subperiods associated with these developments.
In specific, we estimate our bootstrap test for the period between the deficit revision and the
financial assistance request, as well as for the periods preceding and succeeding each event.
Table 5 presents estimates for the period extending from January 2, 2006 (the begin-
ning of our sample) until April 23, 2010 (the Greek Prime Minister’s announcement on
the EU/IMF financial aid request), with November 16, 2009 being the break-date. We ob-
serve that following the deficit revision and until the financial assistance request, the negative
movements in the Greek bond yields are transmitted to each of the remaining countries’ CDS
spreads: all p-values are statistically significant at conventional levels, pointing to the conta-
gious nature of the Greek bonds during the respective period. For what matters, the negative
movements in the Greek bonds led to a rise in default probabilities across the Eurozone as
reflected in euro area CDS spreads. We consequently test for contagion from November 16,
2009 until April 5, 2018 (the end of our sample), with break-date April 23, 2010. Interest-
ingly, contagion phenomena recede in the period following the Greek government’s request
for the EU/IMF economic adjustment programme (non-statistically significant p-values).
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[Insert Table 5 about here.]
This pattern is further confirmed when examining the evolution of the dependence struc-
ture between our series. Figure 2 illustrates the local Gaussian correlation estimates for the
Greek bond yields vis-a`-vis each of the remaining countries’ CDS spreads, for the period
before November 2009 (green line) and for the period between November 2009 and April
2010. Overall we verify an increased sensitivity of the European CDS market to the negative
developments in Greece. The estimates between the Greek sovereign bond and the European
CDS markets provide strong evidence of increased dependence for all country pairs during
the Eurozone crisis. For all the Greek bond–European CDSs pairs, the entire local corre-
lation curve for the pre-crisis period has moved up. It should further be noted that in most
cases there is a similar increase in local correlation over large segments of the distribution.
This in turn, points to the existence of strong linkages between the Greek bond market and
the European CDS markets during the post-crisis period.
[Insert Figure 2 about here.]
On the same line, we contrast local Gaussian correlation estimates for the period between
November 2009 and April 2010 (green line) against estimates for the period after April 2010
(red line) and plot them in Figure 3. Again, we observe a positive correlation across all
country-pairs pre-April 2010 period, that declines post-April 2010. Interestingly, this decline
is more potent for the core relative to the periphery (including Belgium); for the latter, it lies
above zero even after April 2010. This in turn points to the existence of strong linkages
(albeit not contagious) between the Greek bond and these countries’ CDSs after April 2010.
Overall, results from this exercise highlight the dominant role of the November 2009
Greek developments and the contagious capacity of the Greek sovereign bond driven by a
potential Greek default for the rising sovereign credit risk across the Eurozone. Moreover,
they demonstrate the easing effect exerted by the agreement on the joint EU/IMF financial
assistance programme in April 2010.
[Insert Figure 3 about here.]
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6.2 The naked CDS ban
In an attempt to curb destabilizing speculation on distressed Eurozone countries’ default the
EU banned the purchase of naked CDS contracts, effective November 1, 2012.32 Because
bond and CDS markets are complementary, the naked CDS buyers might inflate sovereign
CDS spreads, thereby driving up sovereign bond yields (Silva et al., 2016; Gyntelberg et al.,
2018). As our analysis in Section 5.2 revealed, contagion from the CDS market to the bond
market was mainly observed during the Greek Eurozone exit discussions in November 2011.
Although the Greek-stemming contagion subsided following the cancellation of the ref-
erendum and the formation of a national unity government in Greece, contagion phenomena
were further evident for the remaining countries of the EMU South. During the same pe-
riod, the regulation on naked CDS contracts was voted into law by the European Parliament
(November 15, 2011). Since these events coincide, it might be the case that the intense po-
litical events in Greece curtain the easing effect of the regulatory ban brought about by the
passage of the law, especially on the government bonds of Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
To ensure that we adequately isolate the effect of this regulatory change, we further
examine its impact on the transmission of contagion. We expect that the main operating
channel of transmission is from the CDS market to the bond market. Moreover, although the
regulation’s effective date was known in advance, the voting outcome was fairly unantici-
pated. To this end, Table 6 examines differences in the transmission of contagion from the
GIIPS CDSs to all European bonds in the periods before and after the regulation’s passage
in November 15, 2011. Results from this exercise provide no evidence of contagion from
the periphery CDS markets to any of the two blocs following the EU Parliament’s voting: all
p-values generated by our test are non-statistically significant after November 15, 2011.
[Insert Table 6 about here]
To fully detect whether this reflects a change from the pre-November 2011 period, we
further examine the evolution of the dependence structure between our series. Figure 4,
32The Regulation on Short Selling and certain aspects of Credit Default Swaps was published in the Official
Journal of the European Union on March 24, 2012. The regulation prohibits any person or legal entity in
the European Union from entering into uncovered (“naked”) CDSs on sovereign debt and restricting uncovered
short sales on shares and sovereign debt after November 1, 2012. Effectively, the Regulation bans CDS contacts
on sovereign debt that do not hedge exposure to the sovereign debt itself or to assets or liabilities whose value
is correlated to the value of the sovereign debt.
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illustrates the local Gaussian correlation estimates for the GIIPS CDS spreads vis-a`-vis each
of the remaining countries’ bond yields, for the period before November 15, 2011 (green
line) and the period after (red line). Evidently, there is a strong positive correlation between
the CDSs and bonds of GIIPS pre-November 2011, which recedes to zero in the period after.
On the other hand, the correlation between GIIPS CDSs and core bonds is very close to
zero in both subperiods. Taken together, results from this exercise confirm the containment
effect of the regulatory ban on the transmission of CDS-bond contagion within the EMU
South. The passage of the regulation appears to have strengthened the easing effect exerted
by the reversal of the negative developments in Greece in early November 2011, namely the
country’s political instability and intention about a Eurozone membership referendum.
[Insert Figure 4 about here]
6.3 The role of liquidity
In periods of market distress investors tend to rebalance their portfolios towards less risky
and more liquid securities, a phenomenon usually referred to as “flight-to-quality” or “flight-
to-liquidity” (see Beber et al., 2009; Brunnermeier, 2009; Monfort and Renne, 2014; Fontana
and Scheicher, 2016; Gyntelberg et al., 2018). This is particularly important in the context
of the European sovereign bond market, since the destination of large flows into (and out of)
this market is determined almost exclusively by liquidity (Beber et al., 2009; Monfort and
Renne, 2014).
In practice, it is difficult to disentangle the two phenomena in the Eurozone crisis setting.
If investors decrease their periphery bond holdings in favour of core countries’ bonds, it is
not clear whether they do so because of concerns about credit risk or liquidity risk (also
given the strong correlation between the two). However, if contagion transmission from the
EMU South (due to rising bond yields and/or CDS spreads) is also accompanied by a general
drop in liquidity (an illiquidity contagion) across the same bloc, this would be a supporting
argument that liquidity is an additional driver of investors’ actions during the crisis.
To examine this premise, we test for contagion between sovereign bond and CDS liquid-
ity by replacing our bond yields and CDS spreads with a measure of liquidity, namely the
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quoted bid-ask spread (see Goyenko and Ukhov, 2009).33 To this end, we estimate Equa-
tion (1) with the 5-year sovereign bond (CDS) quoted bid-ask spread as dependent variable,
and use the residuals (filtered data) to test for contagion between our liquidity measures.
In essence, we assume that if the negative developments in the periphery affect investors’
liquidity risk considerations (raising bid-ask spreads), this should also be reflected in the
transmission of illiquidity across that bloc. Furthermore, if investors search for liquidity in
the core, the latter should be relatively immune to liquidity developments in the periphery.
Results from this exercise are presented in Table 7, where we initially focus on the trans-
mission of illiquidity from the GIIPS bonds to all European bonds (Panel A) and CDSs
(Panel B). According to Panel A, an increase in quoted bid-ask spreads in any of the GIIPS
bonds is not transmitted to the bid-ask spreads in the either of the two country-blocs; almost
all p-values are non-statistically significant at conventional levels.
[Insert Table 7 about here]
When turning to Panel B, we notice that a rise in bid-ask spreads in any of the GIIPS
bonds is transmitted to that bloc’s CDSs; importantly, the transmission dates match closely
those of the transmission of price contagion in Panel B of Table 3. Nevertheless, this rise in
periphery bond illiquidity is not transmitted to the core bloc’s CDSs. If this is combined with
the results about the transmission of bond-CDS price contagion in Section 5.1, we can argue
that a rise in credit risk in the periphery has contagious effects on both blocs’ CDS markets,
whereas a rise in liquidity risk is only confined within the periphery CDS markets.
On the other hand, testing for illiquidity contagion stemming from the GIIPS CDS mar-
kets (either to all bond markets or to all CDS markets) did not yield significant results (not
presented for brevity). We conclude, that if anything, liquidity risk is a material source of
risk in the context of the European sovereign CDS market only when stemming from the
sovereign bond market. Moreover, credit risk emerges as a stronger determinant of price
discovery between the two markets relative to liquidity risk.
33The quoted bid-ask spread of the bond (CDS) is equal to (Ask -Bid)/(0.5(Ask+Bid)), where Ask and Bid
are the ask price and bid price respectively of the bond (CDS); see Goyenko and Ukhov (2009).
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6.4 Additional tests
We conduct additional sensitivity tests, the results of which are available on request. First,
we consider the role of arbitrage opportunities as explained by the deviations of the CDS-
bond basis (the basis) from its zero equilibrium value. In fact, arbitrage opportunities during
the Eurozone crisis were primarily present due to “funding frictions” and “short-selling fric-
tions”. While the former type of frictions made it difficult for arbitrageurs to finance the
purchase of the bond (via repo transaction) for implementing a “negative basis trade”, the
latter prevented arbitrageurs to short-sell the bond (in a “positive basis trade”) in order to
profit from the relative mispricing (see Fontana and Scheicher, 2016).
Since arbitrage opportunities affect the equilibrium relationship between bonds and CDS
contracts, we test for contagion transmitted from the GIIPS bond yields towards the CDS-
bond basis of all countries. To accomplish this, we estimate Equation (1) with the 5-year
sovereign CDS-bond basis as dependent variable, and calculate the residuals. We subse-
quently test for contagion between our filtered bond yields and the filtered basis series.
Across our sample period, we find no dates that indicate contagion transmission from the
GIIPS bonds to the basis of any country in the two blocs. This is further evident, when the
reverse direction is considered, i.e., from the GIIPS basis to all European bond yields.
We conclude that although arbitrage forces might have been present in the context of the
Eurozone crisis, they have nevertheless been unable to affect contagion dynamics. In fact,
frictions and imperfections such as illiquidity and high trading costs often prevent arbitrage
forces from fully closing the pricing gaps between the two markets; if markets are subject to
such frictions, it is possible that the correcting mechanisms may have different regimes with
different adjustment speeds (Gyntelberg et al., 2018).
Second, we investigate the impact of the ECB’s government bond purchases under the
Securities Markets Programme (SMP). These purchases aimed at lowering yields and liq-
uidity premia in the distressed countries’ sovereign bonds and restoring the monetary policy
transmission in the euro area (see Eser and Schwab, 2016). As such, we expect that these
purchases contributed to the minimization of the contagion transmission from the GIIPS
bond markets. To examine this, we test for differences in intra-bond contagion before and
after the SMP’s implementation in May 10, 2010. We find no evidence of contagion follow-
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ing the May 2010 period. We consequently test for changes in the correlation of our series
with May 10, 2010 as break-date; again the correlation is around zero in both subperiods.
Since the programme was reactivated in August 7, 2011 to enable the purchases of Italian
and Spanish bonds, we further test for contagion before and after the respective date; again,
results confirm the absence of intra-bond contagion between almost all country-pairs.
Finally, we consider the impact of the two LTRO auctions (December 8, 2011 and Febru-
ary 29, 2012) on the contagion transmission from the GIIPS bonds to all European bonds.
If the massive liquidity injections to the euro area banking sector eased sovereign default
concerns via the sovereign-bank nexus, we expect the minimization of contagion phenom-
ena following these auctions. We fail to find any contagion phenomena within the European
sovereign bond market in the periods before and after each of the auction dates.
6.5 Summing up
Overall, the results in this section suggest that sovereign bond and CDS contagion dynamics
have exhibited heterogeneities during the Eurozone crisis. These heterogeneities are mainly
associated with the occurrence of certain fiscal and regulatory events during the main phase
of the crisis. Furthermore, the contagion phenomena primarily arise due to credit risk con-
cerns, although liquidity risk also plays a non-trivial role, particularly when stemming from
the GIIPS bond markets.
7 Conclusion
By adopting the correlation concept of contagion by Bekaert et al. (2005), and employing
a new measure of local Gaussian correlation by Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013), we ex-
amine asymmetric and nonlinear changes in dependence structure and test for contagion in
the European sovereign bond and CDS markets during the 2006-2018 period. Our empir-
ical findings suggest that contagion phenomena in the European sovereign bond and CDS
markets have undergone two major phases.
The first phase extends from late 2009 to mid 2011 and concerns the outright transmission
of contagion from the bond markets of the EMU South towards the CDS markets of both
EMU blocs. Most correlation break-points that indicate contagion are concentrated around
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important economic events. These include the Greek deficit’s upward revision (November
2009) and the consequent first rescue plan for Greece (April 2010), the financial assistance
programmes in Ireland and Portugal (November 2010 and April 2011 respectively) and the
negative economic developments in Italy and Spain (July-August 2011). In contrast, during
these intense periods, bond markets in either blocs appear immune to contagion stemming
from the periphery bond markets; they were rather subject to a “wake-up call” during the late
2008-early 2009 period. This “wake-up call” prompted investors to reassess the vulnerability
of Eurozone countries, leading to a repricing of the factors that affect sovereign bond pricing
(Bekaert et al., 2014; Claeys and Vasˇı`cek, 2014)
The second phase is during November 2011 and the Greece’s referendum announcement
that prolonged political uncertainty and revived the fears of the country’s Eurozone exit.
This period is characterized by contagion stemming a) from periphery CDS spreads towards
bond yields in the periphery and Belgium and b) from Italian and Spanish CDS spreads
towards CDS spreads in both EMU blocs. The outbreak of CDS-stemming contagion during
the respective period marks the development of the Greek debt crisis into a European debt
crisis. During this escalation, Italy and Spain emerge as key countries for the evolution of
sovereign credit risk across the Eurozone. This is consistent with the “too big to bail out”
status of either country. Arguably, the fears that a Greek default would generate a domino
effect, causing Italy and Spain to fall as well, were well-founded.
Our examination of the mechanisms of contagion transmission shows that liquidity risk
is an important source of risk in the European CDS market, but only when stemming from
the bond market. We content that credit risk is a stronger determinant of price discovery and
contagion transmission between the two markets relative to liquidity risk. We further show
that although arbitrage forces may be present, they were unable to fully close the pricing gaps
between the two markets and affect contagion dynamics. Last, by studying the regulatory
response during the crisis, we provide evidence that the voting of the naked CDS ban exerted
a containment effect on the transmission of CDS-bond contagion within the EMU South.
A clear implication from our analysis concerns the management of the financial institu-
tions’ exposures, which should correspond to the nature and channels of contagion during
crises. In addition to first-order/direct exposures, regulation should encourage financial in-
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stitutions to also manage second-order risks, such as those related to intra- and cross-asset
correlations, particularly when being largely exposed to sovereign debt issues by countries
under fiscal strain. To this end, the identification of the extent to which contagion phenom-
ena depend on bilateral and multilateral exposures between countries would be of interest.
We leave that to future research.
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Table 1: This table presents the changes in basis points on 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads after a specific adverse event on GIIPS (Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain). (1) On November 5, 2009, the Greek government revealed a revised budget deficit of 12.7% of GDP for 2009. (2) On
January 15, 2009, Ireland abandons plans to inject e1.5 bn into third largest bank Anglo Irish Bank and nationalises the commercial lender amid fears it
could collapse. (3) On April 18, 2012, the Italian government cut its growth forecast for the economy in 2012, predicting a further shrink by 0.8%. (4)
On April 6, 2011, Portugal requests a bailout from the EU. (5) On April 27, 2012, the rating agency Standard and Poor’s has lowered the rating of Spain
by two notches to triple B plus and maintained a negative outlook. The last two columns present the correlation coefficient between changes on bond
yields and CDS spreads in basis points before and after a specific event.
Correlation
∆(Bond) vs ∆(CDS)
AT BE DE ES FI FR GR IE IT NL PT pre-event post-event
Panel A: ∆(Bond)
GR (1) Budget revision 0.04 0.08 -1.06 1.75 0.08 -2.16 40 -2.33 -2.51 -3.94 5.3 0.36 0.59
IE (2) Rescue AIB -3.29 -1.74 -5.54 -1.27 -0.95 1.22 -3.39 5.32 -5.94 4.29 -2.52 -0.13 0.55
IT (3) Growth forecast revision -1.64 -2.86 -2 -8.83 -2.89 -0.7 -4.77 -0.51 -0.25 -2.33 -18.45 0.57 0.72
PT (4) Bailout request 0.79 1.27 1.42 0.38 1.36 1.24 -2.53 -21.43 -0.67 1.61 10.21 0.48 0.51
ES (5) S&P downgrade -1.85 -0.33 0.55 11.65 -2.16 0.26 -15.32 0.51 4.54 -2.12 -62.04 0.53 0.75
Panel B: ∆(CDS)
GR (1) Budget revision 2.99 8.66 6.80 23.74 2.01 6.94 127.69 24.15 20.67 3.36 75.53
IE (2) Rescue AIB 4.43 -0.15 2.10 3.27 -0.17 1.35 5.69 35.54 1.48 2.11 1.24
IT (3) Growth forecast revision 4.54 9.72 4.50 6.56 2.52 1.10 // 5.25 18.99 6.79 -0.68
PT (4) Bailout request -0.74 -2.54 -0.74 -3.00 -0.91 -1.47 2.31 -15.46 -0.28 -0.58 10.94
ES (5) S&P downgrade -3.42 -2.67 -1.60 4.31 -0.82 -1.86 // -4.84 0.07 -4.66 -37.97
3
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Table 2: This table reports means, standard deviations, maximums and minimums for bond yield and CDS spread changes (in basis points). Bond yields
is the yield on 5-year on-the-run sovereign bonds. CDS spread is the change in 5-year sovereign CDSs. The sample includes Austria, Belgium, Finland,
France, Ireland, Italy, Germany, Hellenic Republic (Greece), the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain. Bond yields are from Datastream, and CDS spreads are
from Markit. The sample period for Greece is January 2, 2006 to March 8, 2012.
∆(Bond yields) ∆(CDS spreads) Obs.#
Mean Std. Dev Max. Min. Mean Std. Dev Max. Min.
AT -0.119 4.41 37.32 -34.43 0.003 4.23 44.28 -28.11 3090
BE -0.122 4.79 43.77 -50.30 0.003 5.38 40.55 -57.38 3090
DE -0.124 3.73 19.12 -22.51 0.002 2.41 20.81 -20.27 3090
ES -0.113 7.08 60.51 -88.94 0.008 10.94 96.88 -102.66 3090
FI -0.121 4.63 51.17 -41.18 0.003 2.64 25.49 -25.73 3090
FR -0.119 3.93 34.54 -46.41 0.003 4.66 46.79 -44.93 3090
GR 2.420 45.86 516.57 -551.57 15.398 643.86 9025.77 -9888.18 1505
IE -0.120 10.86 102.04 -148.00 0.004 11.48 113.79 -152.45 3090
IT -0.102 7.25 69.20 -91.05 0.018 16.32 162.73 -161.76 3090
NL -0.122 5.77 85.29 -89.16 0.014 29.56 274.84 -275.94 3090
PT -0.108 18.30 409.19 -222.46 0.002 3.67 79.10 -74.23 3090
GIIPS 0.395 17.87 231.50 -220.40 3.086 137.26 1895.65 -2075.85
Core -0.121 4.54 45.20 -47.33 0.005 8.15 75.46 -75.39
3
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Table 3: Bootstrap test for contagion considering GIIPS as the countries of origin. This table shows p-values
from the bootstrap test for contagion according to the time dates of correlation change-points estimated with
the algorithm of Galeano and Weid (2014) based on the standardized yields–spreads. The null hypothesis
indicates no contagion between the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) bonds and the European bond (Panel A) and
CDS (Panel B) markets. The bootstrap test for contagion is based on 1000 replications. The sample period
starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South
countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 0.995 13/10/2008 0.099 29/1/2009 0.612 20/7/2011 0.999 9/10/2009 0.694 8/12/2009
0.987 30/11/2009 0.871 25/3/2010 0.677 22/3/2010 0.230 11/6/2012
BE 0.993 6/8/2009 0.450 3/3/2010 0.451 12/4/2011
DE 0.998 16/10/2008 0.958 25/2/2009 0.997 22/10/2008 0.999 26/9/2008 0.853 29/12/2008
0.962 26/11/2009 0.348 2/12/2010 0.995 27/4/2010 0.954 26/11/2009 0.768 3/8/2011
0.965 7/7/2011
ES 0.412 23/12/2009 0.045 1/12/2010 0.000 20/7/2011 0.013 24/3/2011
0.887 30/6/2015 0.899 3/7/2015
FI 0.975 26/10/2009 0.931 2/12/2010 0.999 2/7/2008 0.985 22/4/2011 0.974 3/12/2009
0.812 5/3/2014 0.996 19/5/2010 0.063 20/7/2011
FR 0.870 16/11/2009 0.765 1/4/2010 0.986 18/7/2011 0.956 29/1/2010 0.350 14/7/2009
0.631 9/12/2010 0.349 20/4/2011 0.512 18/7/2011
GR 0.112 9/12/2009 0.371 15/10/2008 0.350 17/2/2009 0.630 23/12/2009
0.968 22/11/2009
IE 0.034 9/12/2009 0.980 30/11/2010 0.154 1/12/2010
IT 0.941 15/10/2008 0.662 10/2/2010 0.012 20/7/2011
0.855 22/11/2009 0.635 20/5/20111 0.312 30/6/2015
NL 0.991 14/10/2009 0.978 23/1/2009 0.830 24/6/2011 0.891 30/9/2009 0.794 20/6/2011
0.208 1/4/2011
PT 0.944 17/12/2009 0.750 30/11/2010 0.332 10/2/2010 0.614 24/3/2011
0.428 20/5/2011 0.431 3/7/2015
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 0.039 2/11/2009 0.035 15/11/2010 0.008 18/7/2011 0.000 28/3/2011 0.000 1/8/2011
BE 0.000 6/11/2009 0.000 25/11/2010 0.019 22/7/2011 0.000 1/4/2011 0.000 3/8/2011
0.000 21/4/2010
DE 0.004 5/11/2009 0.041 23/11/2010 0.033 20/7/2011 0.000 18/4/2011 0.032 20/7/2011
0.662 22/04/2010
ES 0.000 9/11/2009 0.006 2/12/2010 0.000 20/7/2011 0.000 11/4/2011
0.000 22/4/2010 0.540 25/07/2011
FI 0.000 13/11/2009 0.002 2/8/2011 0.037 4/5/2011 0.000 3/8/2011
FR 0.002 5/11/2009 0.001 12/11/2010 0.000 20/7/2011 0.014 18/4/2011 0.000 18/7/2011
0.431 21/04/2010
GR 0.269 2/1/2008 0.212 6/11/2009 0.961 17/11/2009 0.881 9/11/2009
0.057 12/11/2009 0.571 20/4/2010 0.412 22/4/2010 0.417 22/4/2010
IE 0.502 2/1/2008 0.615 3/12/2010 0.312 30/11/2010 0.770 2/12/2010
0.009 12/11/2009 0.000 15/7/2011 0.041 29/3/2011 0.000 25/7/2011
IT 0.000 6/11/2009 0.008 3/12/2010 0.000 12/4/2011 0.000 20/7/2011
0.000 20/4/2010 0.415 15/7/2011
NL 0.083 5/11/2009 0.000 10/12/2010 0.016 2/8/2011 0.012 4/5/2011 0.016 18/7/2011
PT 0.001 17/11/2009 0.000 30/11/2010 0.000 12/4/2011 0.000 5/5/2011 0.045 11/4/2011
0.000 22/4/2010 0.565 29/3/2011
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Table 4: Bootstrap test for contagion considering GIIPS as the countries of origin. This table shows p-values
from the bootstrap test for contagion according to the time dates of correlation change-points estimated with
the algorithm of Galeano and Weid (2014) based on the standardized yields–spreads. The null hypothesis
indicates no contagion between the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) CDS and the European bond (Panel A) and
CDS (Panel B) markets. The bootstrap test for contagion is based on 1000 replications. The sample period
starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South
countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 0.233 2/11/2009 0.148 13/10/2011 0.912 31/10/2011 0.064 25/10/2011
0.411 4/11/2011 0.000 21/11/2011
BE 0.000 3/11/2011 0.000 14/11/2011 0.137 30/11/2010
DE 0.872 22/4/2010 0.341 12/10/2011 0.832 26/9/2008 0.985 26/9/2008 0.946 26/9/2008
0.307 25/10/2011 0.204 15/5/2013 0.742 26/2/2010
ES 0.018 8/11/2011 0.000 15/11/2011 0.000 9/11/2011 0.885 6/4/2010
0.996 7/8/2015 0.991 22/6/2015 0.000 16/11/2011
FI 0.311 13/11/2009 0.962 9/1/2008 0.865 23/4/2010 0.994 10/9/2008 0.807 23/4/2010
0.411 15/11/2011 0.981 23/4/2010 0.411 21/10/2013 0.962 15/5/2013 0.639 15/5/2013
FR 0.452 21/4/2010 0.948 17/7/2008 0.757 13/11/2009 0.912 26/9/2008 0.720 6/4/2010
0.127 10/10/2011 0.412 18/11/2011 0.002 1/8/2011 0.518 8/11/2011
GR 0.011 9/11/2011 0.000 10/11/2011 0.011 9/11/2011 0.000 8/11/2011
IE 0.009 9/11/2011 0.012 12/10/2010 0.000 18/11/2011 0.050 15/11/2011
0.997 17/11/2011 0.619 7/8/2015
IT 0.000 10/11/2011 0.912 12/10/2010 0.000 14/11/2011 0.000 9/11/2011
0.003 17/11/2011 0.004 22/6/2015
NL 0.981 5/11/2009 0.965 1/7/2008 0.992 23/1/2009 0.975 10/9/2008 0.963 26/9/2008
0.757 7/11/2011 0.438 3/8/2010 0.659 26/3/2013 0.589 26/3/2013
PT 0.046 9/11/2011 0.000 18/11/2011 0.018 14/11/2011 0.589 6/4/2010
0.000 16/11/2011
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 0.992 4/1/2013 0.032 21/11/2011 0.822 15/9/2008 0.988 15/9/2008
0.996 1/2/2012 0.032 3/1/2012
BE 0.994 28/1/2012 0.000 9/1/2012 0.963 13/1/2012 0.045 9/1/2012
DE 0.788 13/1/2012 0.000 16/1/2012 0.975 15/9/2008 0.021 18/1/2012
0.992 13/1/2012
ES 0.041 18/11/2011 0.000 21/11/2011 0.987 31/10/2011
FI 0.000 1/10/2008 0.899 19/1/2012 0.000 1/12/2011 0.641 2/1/2012 0.010 14/11/2011
FR 0.019 9/1/2012 0.418 12/11/2009 0.046 5/1/2012
0.966 1/2/2013 0.847 13/1/2012 0.968 1/2/2013
GR 0.411 11/11/2011 0.000 14/9/2010 0.009 18/11/2011
IE 0.000 11/11/2011 0.021 15/11/2011 0.872 5/1/2012
0.958 31/8/2015
IT 0.983 14/9/2010 0.672 15/11/2011 0.868 14/11/2012 0.000 21/11/2011
0.784 31/8/2015 0.994 3/9/2012 0.885
NL 0.000 12/9/2008 0.760 7/12/2012 0.005 20/1/2012 0.716 5/9/2008 0.772 15/9/2008
0.911 13/9/2010 0.988 13/1/2012 0.000 18/1/2012
PT 0.967 5/1/2012 0.000 14/11/2012 0.009 31/10/2011
0.991 3/9/2012
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Table 5: This Table presents the estimated p-values from the bootstrap test for contagion
from the Greek bond yields (Column 2) and CDS spreads (Column 4) to the rest of the
European sovereign CDS markets. Greece (GR) is considered as the country of origin for
the European sovereign debt crisis. Significance levels at 10%, 5% and 1% are denoted by
*,**,***. Yes indicates that the null of no contagion is rejected at 5% level. The bootstrap
test for contagion is based on 1000 replications.
Deficit Revision
November 2009
Financial Request
April 2010
Origin:Greece Bonds(GR) Contagion? CDS(GR) Contagion?
European CDS Markets
Austria 0.001*** Yes 0.992 No
Belgium 0.004*** Yes 0.885 No
Finland 0.001*** Yes 0.912 No
France 0.000*** Yes 0.709 No
Germany 0.005*** Yes 0.763 No
Ireland 0.050** Yes 0.446 No
Italy 0.021** Yes 0.000 No
Netherlands 0.009*** Yes 0.770 No
Portugal 0.013** Yes 0.414 No
Spain 0.000*** Yes 0.558 No
Table 6: This Table presents the estimated p-values from the bootstrap test for contagion from
the GIIPS CDS spreads to the rest of the European sovereign bond markets. The bootstrap
test for contagion is based on 1000 replications.
GR
(1)
IE
(2)
IT
(3)
PT
(4)
ES
(5)
European Bond Markets
AT 0.512 0.899 0.377 0.788 0.521
BE 0.487 0.525 0.614 0.411 0.947
DE 0.215 0.395 0.881 0.632 0.628
ES 0.855 0.884 0.934 0.941 –
FI 0.860 0.647 0.865 0.548 0.488
FR 0.412 0.912 0.954 0.684 0.923
GR – 0.662 0.266 0.985 0.912
IE 0.350 – 0.744 0.325 0.624
IT 0.975 0.789 – 0.478 0.784
NL 0.455 0.246 0.989 0.658 0.998
PT 0.990 0.411 0.221 – 0.444
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Table 7: Bootstrap test for contagion considering GIIPS as the countries of origin. This table shows p-values
from the bootstrap test for contagion according to the time dates of correlation change-points estimated with
the algorithm of Galeano and Weid (2014) based on the quoted bid-ask spreads. The null hypothesis indicates
no contagion between the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) bonds and the European bond (Panel A) and CDS (Panel
B) markets. The bootstrap test for contagion is based on 1000 replications. The sample period starts on January
2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 0.912 7/11/2011 0.890 22/9/2008
BE 0.988 6/10/2009 0.690 4/1/2010 0.885 29/6/2011 0.540 6/10/2010 0.964 22/06/2011
DE 0.717 2/10/2009 0.754 14/12/2009 0.996 7/7/2011 0.556 5/7/2011
ES 0.991 17/09/2009 0.662 18/3/2010 0.785 13/7/2011 0.412 12/1/2011
FI 0.998 3/11/2011 0.993 10/2/2010
FR 0.944 21/09/2009 0.991 5/3/2010 0.911 11/11/2009
GR 0.090 14/10/2009 0.680 29/6/2011 0.630 22/09/2009 0.993 17/09/2009
IE 0.431 14/10/2009 0.545 29/3/2010 0.997 28/1/2009 0.525 18/3/2010
IT 0.989 29/6/2011 0.756 2/2/2010 0.689 16/11/2009 0.754 25/4/2011 0.669 13/7/2011
NL 0.955 24/11/2011 0.460 10/12/2009 0.830 10/5/2010 0.674 6/10/2009
PT 0.990 22/09/2009 0.889 28/1/2009 0.332 25/4/2011 0.285 12/1/2011
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 0.995 12/10/2009 0.344 25/11/2010 0.511 21/7/2011 0.878 21/3/2011 0.691 25/7/2011
BE 0.110 20/11/2009 0.996 30/3/2011 0.785 15/8/2011
DE 0.443 30/11/2009 0.675 8/11/2010 0.997 11/7/2011 0.994 5/4/2011 0.887 15/8/2011
ES 0.000 16/11/2009 0.002 24/11/2010 0.006 2/8/2011 0.004 14/4/2011
FI 0.998 24/11/2009 0.887 2/11/2010 0.422 28/4/2011 0.998 12/8/2011
FR 0.898 23/11/2009 0.832 4/7/2011 0.991 2/8/2011
GR 0.000 28/10/2009 0.000 2/11/2009 0.012 12/11/2009 0.036 16/11/2009
IE 0.004 28/10/2009 0.032 20/6/2011 0.044 9/12/2010 0.047 24/11/2010
IT 0.000 2/11/2009 0.008 9/12/2010 0.007 18/7/2011 0.022 2/8/2011
NL 0.687 19/11/2009 0.541 1/12/2010 0.745 7/7/2011 0.132 9/5/2011 0.998 21/7/2011
PT 0.040 12/11/2009 0.000 22/11/2010 0.021 18/7/2011 0.044 14/4/2011
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(A) EMU North 5-year sovereign bond yields
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(B) EMU South 5-year sovereign bond yields
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(C) EMU North 5-year sovereign CDS spreads
02.0
1.20
06
15.0
9.20
08
05.1
1.20
09
03.0
5.20
10
02.1
1.20
11
08.0
3.20
12
05.0
4.20
18
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Austria
Belgium
Finland
France
Germany
Netherlands
(D) EMU South 5-year sovereign CDS spreads
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Figure 1: Evolution of sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads (in basis points). Panels A and C show the 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads for the
countries of the EMU North (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands) and Panels B and D show the 5-year sovereign bond yields and CDS spreads
for the countries of the EMU South (Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain). In Panels B and D, Greece is shown on the right axis while the rest EMU South countries
are shown on the left axis.
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Figure 2: Local Gaussian correlation estimates between the Greek sovereign bond yields and each of the Euro-
pean sovereign CDS yields following Greece’s upward deficit revision on November 16, 2009.
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Figure 3: Local Gaussian correlation estimates between the Greek sovereign bond yields and each of the Euro-
pean sovereign CDS yields following Greece’s request for financial assistance in April 23, 2010.
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Figure 4: Local Gaussian correlation estimates between the GIIPS CDS spreads and each of the European sovereign bond yields following the voting of the naked CDS ban
on November 15, 2011.
A Appendix
A.1 Galeano and Weid (2014) algorithm for the identification of struc-
tural changes in correlation
Given a sample of 1...T observations of the returns vector (y1,t, y2,t)
′
, let ρt denote the true
but unknown unconditional correlation between y1,t and y2,t at time t.
The algorithm starts with testing the null hypothesis of constant correlations against the
alternative hypothesis of a change-point tc:
H0 : ρt = ρ for all t ∈ {1, ..., T} vs H1 : ∃t
c ∈ {1, ..., T − 1} such that ρtc 6= ρtc+1
This is accomplished using the model-free fluctuation-type test originally proposed by
Wied et al. (2012). The test statistic is defined as:
QT := D̂max
2≤t≤T
t√
T
|ρ̂t − ρ̂T | (A.1)
where ρ̂t is the sample correlation over the period 1 to t. The scalar coefficient D̂ is
needed to adjust for correlation breaks that appear at the beginning of the sample where ρ̂t
is more volatile, and is constructed as follows:
Let
{
(y1,t, y2,t)
′}
be the bivariate time-series with E
(
(y1,t, y2,t)
′) = 0. For i = 1, 2
denote yi = T
−1∑T
i=1 yi,t, y
2
i = T
−1∑T
i=1 y
2
i,t and σ̂yi =
√
y2i − yi
2. Furher, denote y1y2 =
T−1
∑T
t=1 y1,ty2,t and σ̂y1y2 = y1y2 − y1 · y2. Let k (·) be the Bartlett kernel fuction. The
scalar D̂ is then given by:
D̂ =
√
D̂3D̂2D̂1D̂
′
3D̂
′
3, where D̂1 =
T∑
t=1
T∑
u=1
k
(
t−u
⌊log T ⌋
)
VtV
′
u with
Vt = T
−1/2
(
y21,t − y
2
1, y
2
2,t − y
2
2, y1,t − y1, y2,t − y2, y1,ty2,t − y1y2
)′
,
D̂2 =
 1 0 −2y1 0 00 1 0 −2y1 0
0 0 −y2 −y1 1

and
D̂3 =
(
−1
2
σ̂y1y2
σ̂y2
σ̂−3y1 −
1
2
σ̂y1y2
σ̂y1
σ̂−3y2 ·
1
σ̂y1y2
)
The purpose of the scalar D̂ is to appropriately rescale the cumulated sum of empirical
correlation coefficients in such a way that convergence of QT to the asymptotic null distri-
bution is achieved.
Under the null hypothesis and several reasonable moment and dependency restrictions,
the test statistic QT is asymptotically Kolmogorov distributed (Wied et al., 2012, Theorem
1). If QT stays below the upper critical value (see Eq.A.1) the null hypothesis of constant
correlation cannot be rejected and the algorithm stops. Otherwise, H0 is rejected and there
is at least one change-point tc within the sample period. The estimator for the single change-
point is given by:
tc = arg max
t
D̂ t√
T
|ρ̂t − ρ̂T |
To identify further change-points, the sample is split into the two subsamples
[
1, ..., t̂c
]
and
[
t̂c + 1, ..., T
]
. These subsamples are then both tested individually. This procedure is
repeated until no further change-points are detected. Galeano and Weid (2014) show that
the presence of multiple change-points can affect the test’s efficiency in identifying the true
number of change points.
The last step of the algorithm therefore consists of a refining process in which the vector
of the n detected change-points τ =
[
t̂c1, ..., t̂
c
n
]
, sorted in ascending date order t̂c1 ≤ ... ≤ t̂
c
n,
is verified in subsamples containing only a single change point. Define the first observa-
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tion of the sample as t̂c0 = 0, the last observation as t̂
c
n+1 = T, and form the subsamples[
t̂ci−1 + 1, ..., t̂
c
i+1
]
for i = 1, ..., n. Each subsample starts at the first observation following
the previous change-point t̂ci−1, includes change point t̂
c
i ,but ends just before the next change-
point t̂ci+1. These subsamples are tested individually. If the null hypothesis is not rejected the
change-point contained in the subsample is removed from τ .
The following brief example should clarify the test procedure. To test for a break in the
daily correlation between Greek and German bond yields we start with the full sample from
January 2, 2006 (02/01/2006) to April 5, 2018 (05/04/2018). In the first iteration, the proce-
dure detects a change in the correlation at time point 28/10/2008 (October 28, 2008). Fol-
lowing the proposed procedure, we split the series into two subperiods and look for changes
in the subintervals [02/01/2006–28/10/2008] and [29/10/2008–05/04/2018], respectively. In
the second subinterval, the procedure detects a change at time point 13/11/2009. The test
statistic in the first subsample is insignificant. Then, we split the subinterval [29/10/2008–
05/04/2018] into two subintervals and look for changes in the subintervals [29/10/2008,
13/11/2009] and [13/11/2009, 05/04/2018]. No more changes were found in these two subin-
tervals. Then, we pass to step 3 and refine the search. For that we estimate the location of
the change points in the intervals [02/01/2006–28/10/2008] and [13/11/2009, 05/04/2018],
respectively. The test statistics for both subsamples remain significant and confirms the pres-
ence of both changepoints:τ = [28/10/2008,13/11/2009]. According to Galeano and Weid
(2014), this procedure detects the correct number of correlation change-points.
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A.2 Local Gaussian approximation and local correlation
Assume two return series with observed values {(Xt, Zt) t = 1, ..., T}. The correlation
between them conditionally on being in the region S can be written as:
ρˆc (S) =
∑
(Xt,Zt)
(Xt − µˆX,c) (Zt − µˆZ,c)[∑
(Xt,Zt)∈S
(Xt − µˆX,c)
2
] 1
2
[∑
(Xt,Zt)∈S
(Zt − µˆZ,c)
2
] 1
2
(2)
where µˆX,c =
1
nS
∑
(Xt,Zt)∈S
Xt and µˆZ,c =
1
nS
∑
(Xt,Zt)∈S
Zt with nS being the number of
pairs with (Xt, Zt) ∈ S. For ergodic series {Xt, Zt} as nS → ∞, ρˆc (S) would converge to
ρˆc (S) = corr (X,Z | (X,Z) ∈ S).
A general bivariate density f for the variables (X,Z) would be fitted locally in a neigh-
borhood of each point y = (x, z) , by a bivariate Gaussian density,
φ (u, θ (y)) =
1
2piσ1 (y) σ2 (y)
×
exp
{
−
1
2 (1− ρ2 (y))
[(
u1 − µ1 (y)
σ1 (y)
)2
+
(
u2 − µ2 (y)
σ2 (y)
)2
− 2ρ (y)
(
u1 − µ1 (y)
σ1 (y)
)(
u2 − µ2 (y)
σ2 (y)
)]}
(3)
where u = (u1, u2)
⊺
is the running variable in the Gaussian distribution and θ (y) =
φ (µ1 (y) , µ2 (y) , σ1 (y) , σ2 (y) , ρ (y)), with µi (y) , i = 1, 2 the local means, σi (y) , i =
1, 2 the local standard deviation and ρ (y) , the local correlation at the point y = (x, z) . The
population values of the local parameters θb (y) = θ (y) are obtained by minimizing the local
penalty function,34
q =
∫
Kb (u− y) [φ (u, θ (y))− log φ (u, θ (y)) f (u)] du (4)
where Kb = (b1b2)
−1
K
(
b−11 (u1 − y1)
)
K
(
b−12 (u2 − y2)
)
is a product kernel with band-
width b = (b1, b2) , and the local Gaussian correlation ρb (y) = ρ (y) is defined as the last
element of the vector θ (y) that minimizes q. Moving to another point y′ = (x′, z′) of f
another Gaussian φ (u, θ (y′)) is required to approximate f in a neighbourhood S ′ of y′. In
this way f may be represented by a family of Gaussian bivariate densities as y varies and
in each specific neighborhood of y, the local dependence properties are described by ρ (y) .
The (local) dependence may be defined to be positive (negative) if ρ (y) ≻ 0 (ρ (y) ≺ 0) .
The bias of conditional correlation is accommodated since the same Gaussian f fits every
point.
Given the observations Yi = (Xi, Zi) , i = 1, ..., n from f the corresponding estimates
θˆ (y) are obtained by maximizing the local log-likelihood function (see Hjort and Jones,
1996),
L (Y1, ..., Yn, θb (y)) = n
−1∑
i
Kb (Yi − y) log φ (Yi, θb (y))−
∫
Kb (u− y)φ (u, θb (y)) du
(5)
34This type of penalty function q was used in Hjort and Jones (1996) for density estimation purposes and
later by Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013) in the development of local Gaussian correlation. The former argue
that q can be interpreted as a locally weighted Kullback-Leibler criterion for measuring the distance between
f (·) and the chosen parametric distribution (in our case φ (·, θ (y)) .
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For the local likelihood function (4) to be consistent with the penalty function q, the θ (y)
is chosen to minimize q, such that it satisfies the following 5-dimensional set of equations:35
∂q
∂θj
=
∫
Kb (u− y)
∂
∂θj
{log (φ (u, θ (y)))} [φ (u, θ (y))− f (u)] du, j = 1, ..., 5 (6)
Using the notation,
γj (·, θ) =
∂
∂θj
{log φ (·, θ)} , (7)
and assuming that E {Kb (Yi − y) uj (Yi, θ (y))} <∞, the law of large numbers gives,
∂L
∂θj
= n−1
∑
iKb (Yi − y) γj (Yi, θ (y))−
∫
Kb (u− y) γj (u, θ (y))φ (u, θ (y)) du
→
∫
Kb (u− y) γj (u, θ (y)) [f (u)− φ (u, θ (y))] du = −
∂q
∂θj
, j = 1, ..., 5 (8)
as n → ∞, we see that (7) can be identified with (5). Also note that as b → ∞ (4) reduces
to the ordinary log-likelihood for a Gaussian distribution φ plus a constant, and hence ρ (y)
reduces to the ordinary global Gaussian correlation. For more details about the local bi →
0, i = 1, 2 and estimation of standard errors, we refer to Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013).
The numerical maximization of the local likelihood (4) leads to local likelihood estimates
θn,b (y) , including estimates ρn,b (y) of the local correlation. It is shown in Tjøstheim and
Hufthammer (2013) that under relatively weak regularity conditions θn,b (y) → θb (y) for b
fixed, and θn,b (y) → θ (y) almost surely for b = bn tending to zero.
36
Berentsen and Tjøstheim (2014, Section 3.4) argue that the bandwidth choice depends on
the nature of the question. To investigate the local dependence structure in the dataset can be
quite informative to compute several bandwidths to obtain information about the dependence
structure on different scales of locality. In some cases it would be beneficial to have a data-
driven bandwidth choice similar to a bandwidth choice for density kernel estimation. In our
empirical analysis, we employ two methods for bandwidth selection, the normal-reference
rule-of-thumb as in Støve et al. (2014) and the methodology of likelihood cross-validation
proposed by Hall et al. (2004).37 Since both approaches provide qualitatively similar results,
we present the bandwidth choice based on the normal-reference rule-of-thumb.38
35More details concerning the local Gaussian theory can be found in Berentsen and Tjøstheim (2014) and
Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013).
36The R-package ’localgauss’ has been used for estimating ρn,b (y). An introduction to the R package
’localgauss’ for estimation and visualization of local dependence is available in Berentsen et al. (2014).
37The R-package ’MASS’ and ’np’ have been used for rule-of-thumb and the data-driven bandwidth selection
methods respectively.
38For further discussion regarding bandwidth selection, see Tjøstheim and Hufthammer (2013).
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A.3 Diagnostic checks in standardised residuals.
Table 8: Q2 (p) denotes the Ljung–Box statistics for tests of lack of correlation of squared standardised residuals derived from each GARCH(1.1) model
with normal errors for different lags (p= 5, 10, 15 and 20). ARCH LM test tests the null hypothesis of no ARCH effects in standardised residuals.
We report the ARCH test p-value for different lag orders (p= 5, 10, 15 and 20). These are based on the Lagrange multiplier test for conditional
heteroscedasticity of Engle (1982).
Bond markets CDS markets
Q2 (5)
[p−value]
Q2 (10)
[p−value]
Q2 (15)
[p−value]
Q2 (20)
[p−value]
Q2 (5)
[p−value]
Q2 (10)
[p−value]
Q2 (15)
[p−value]
Q2 (20)
[p−value]
AT 13.855
[0.017]
16.477
[0.087]
18.557
[0.234]
31.062
[0.060]
4.515
[0.478]
5.973
[0.817]
8.062
[0.921]
16.636
[0.676]
BE 7.403
[0.192]
10.625
[0.388]
15.566
[0.411]
19.023
[0.520]
8.182
[0.146]
20.403
[0.126]
27.387
[0.325]
29.923
[0.071]
DE 0.989
[0.320]
1.252
[0.535]
1.294
[0.730]
1.587
[0.811]
5.283
[0.382]
8.085
[0.621]
12.531
[0.638]
13.644
[0.848]
ES 0.998
[0.963]
3.864
[0.953]
7.634
[0.938]
18.070
[0.583]
0.653
[0.985]
1.172
[1.000]
3.038
[1.000]
3.599
[1.000]
FI 30.752
[0.078]
30.861
[0.099]
30.931
[0.124]
30.959
[0.155]
3.799
[0.579]
6.866
[0.738]
7.892
[0.928]
10.228
[0.964]
FR 7.953
[0.159]
11.395
[0.328]
14.986
[0.452]
18.526
[0.553]
1.189
[0.946]
3.002
[0.981]
3.691
[0.999]
5.589
[0.999]
GR 10.437
[0.064]
17.358
[0.067]
20.369
[0.158]
21.279
[0.322]
3.984
[0.552]
6.444
[0.777]
12.522
[0.639]
13.763
[0.842]
IE 7.183
[0.207]
8.638
[0.567]
21.041
[0.136]
22.510
[0.314]
11.082
[0.05]
14.196
[0.164]
15.023
[0.450]
16.998
[0.653]
IT 1.889
[0.864]
2.803
[0.986]
6.515
[0.970]
30.275
[0.07]
4.606
[0.466]
7.765
[0.652]
9.440
[0.853]
10.950
[0.948]
NL 1.654
[0.895]
2.327
[0.993]
7.356
[0.947]
7.660
[0.994]
12.917
[0.024]
15.148
[0.127]
26.006
[0.053]
28.020
[0.109]
PT 1.893
[0.864]
2.682
[0.988]
3.594
[0.999]
5.401
[0.999]
3.594
[0.609]
6.310
[0.789]
7.878
[0.929]
10.824
[0.951]
ARCH (5) ARCH (10) ARCH (15) ARCH (20) ARCH (5) ARCH (10) ARCH (15) ARCH (20)
AT 0.0126 0.0787 0.2115 0.0617 0.5079 0.8607 0.9494 0.7364
BE 0.1838 0.3755 0.4085 0.5324 0.1467 0.1612 0.1399 0.1093
DE 0.3204 0.5411 0.7302 0.8133 0.3891 0.6625 0.6594 0.8762
ES 0.9628 0.9529 0.9246 0.6076 0.9851 0.9996 0.9995 1.0000
FI 0.0845 0.1067 0.1337 0.1565 0.5937 0.7445 0.9327 0.9709
FR 0.1463 0.3143 0.4399 0.5621 0.9464 0.9806 0.9984 0.9992
GR 0.0648 0.0893 0.2375 0.4178 0.5484 0.7889 0.5959 0.8303
IE 0.1803 0.5132 0.1208 0.3087 0.0534 0.2120 0.5096 0.7038
IT 0.8632 0.9861 0.9677 0.0679 0.4724 0.7074 0.8755 0.9644
NL 0.8981 0.9931 0.9504 0.9950 0.0214 0.1148 0.0334 0.1081
PT 0.8684 0.9887 0.9988 0.9991 0.6051 0.7667 0.9183 0.9466
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A.4 Galeano and Weid (2014) test for structural changes in correlation.
Table 9: This table shows test statistic QT as defined in Eq.(1) for the fundamentals-filtered yields between
the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) bonds and the European bonds (Panel A) or CDS (Panel B) markets. The
null hypothesis of constant correlations is rejected if the test statistic exceeds the critical value at the 5%
significance level. * denotes statistically significant change points at 5% level. Critical values are: 10%:
1.22, 5%: 1.36, and 1%: 1.63. The sample period starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for
Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 1.60* 13/10/2008 1.77* 29/1/2009 2.93* 20/7/2011 3.17* 9/10/2009 2.61* 8/12/2009
1.84* 30/11/2009 2.16* 25/3/2010 1.50* 22/3/2010 1.76* 11/6/2012
BE 1.99* 6/8/2009 1.84* 3/3/2010 2.05* 12/4/2011
DE 2.65* 16/10/2008 3.01* 25/2/2009 2.60* 22/10/2008 2.00* 26/9/2008 1.66* 29/12/2008
1.74* 26/11/2009 3.32* 2/12/2010 2.72* 27/4/2010 1.43* 26/11/2009 2.35* 3/8/2011
1.62* 7/7/2011
ES 2.16* 23/12/2009 1.74* 1/12/2010 4.00* 20/7/2011 2.59* 24/3/2011
2.15* 30/6/2015 2.37* 3/7/2015
FI 3.10* 26/10/2009 2.34* 2/12/2010 2.54* 2/7/2008 1.81* 22/4/2011 2.15* 3/12/2009
3.30* 5/3/2014 2.60* 19/5/2010 2.66* 20/7/2011
FR 1.54* 16/11/2009 3.13* 1/4/2010 1.91* 18/7/2011 3.43* 29/1/2010 2.59* 14/7/2009
1.75* 9/12/2010 2.24* 20/4/2011 2.37* 18/7/2011
GR 1.83* 9/12/2009 1.82* 15/10/2008 1.72* 17/2/2009 2.16* 23/12/2009
1.41* 22/11/2009
IE 1.83* 9/12/2009 3.19* 30/11/2010 1.74* 1/12/2010
IT 1.82* 15/10/2008 2.27* 10/2/2010 4.00* 20/7/2011
1.41* 22/11/2009 3.11* 20/5/20111 2.15* 30/6/2015
NL 1.92* 14/10/2009 3.44* 23/1/2009 1.83* 24/6/2011 3.61* 30/9/2009 1.79* 20/6/2011
2.14* 1/4/2011
PT 1.72* 17/12/2009 3.19* 30/11/2010 2.27* 10/2/2010 2.59* 24/3/2011
3.11* 20/5/2011 2.37* 3/7/2015
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 1.75* 2/11/2009 1.79* 15/11/2010 2.86* 18/7/2011 1.66* 28/3/2011 3.50* 1/8/2011
BE 1.62* 6/11/2009 2.42* 25/11/2010 2.38* 22/7/2011 1.64* 1/4/2011 2.27* 3/8/2011
1.91* 21/4/2010
DE 2.60* 5/11/2009 2.32* 23/11/2010 3.07* 20/7/2011 2.77* 18/4/2011 3.87* 20/7/2011
1.55* 22/04/2010
ES 2.60* 9/11/2009 1.74* 2/12/2010 2.63* 20/7/2011 1.69* 11/4/2011
1.70* 22/4/2010 2.14* 25/07/2011
FI 2.43* 13/11/2009 3.52* 2/8/2011 2.60* 4/5/2011 3.37* 3/8/2011
FR 1.74* 5/11/2009 1.75* 12/11/2010 3.01* 20/7/2011 1.91* 18/4/2011 2.43* 18/7/2011
2.14* 21/04/2010
GR 2.30* 2/1/2008 3.10* 6/11/2009 1.94* 17/11/2009 2.60* 9/11/2009
2.05* 12/11/2009 2.45* 20/4/2010 2.77* 22/4/2010 1.70* 22/4/2010
IE 2.30* 2/1/2008 2.14* 3/12/2010 2.70* 30/11/2010 1.74* 2/12/2010
2.05* 12/11/2009 2.76* 15/7/2011 1.67* 29/3/2011 2.14* 25/7/2011
IT 3.10* 6/11/2009 2.14* 3/12/2010 1.75* 12/4/2011 2.63* 20/7/2011
2.45* 20/4/2010 2.76* 15/7/2011
NL 3.19* 5/11/2009 1.57* 10/12/2010 2.92* 2/8/2011 2.99* 4/5/2011 2.10* 18/7/2011
PT 1.94* 17/11/2009 2.70* 30/11/2010 1.75* 12/4/2011 2.83* 5/5/2011 1.69* 11/4/2011
2.77* 22/4/2010 1.67* 29/3/2011
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Table 10: This table shows test statisticQT as defined in Eq.(1) for the fundamentals-filtered yields between
the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) CDS and the European bond (Panel A) or CDS (Panel B) markets. The
null hypothesis of constant correlations is rejected if the test statistic exceeds the critical value at the 5%
significance level. * denotes statistically significant change points at 5% level. Critical values are: 10%:
1.22, 5%: 1.36, and 1%: 1.63. The sample period starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for
Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 1.35* 2/11/2009 1.65* 13/10/2011 1.77* 31/10/2011 2.33* 25/10/2011
2.29* 4/11/2011 2.77* 21/11/2011
BE 2.92* 3/11/2011 2.23* 14/11/2011 1.91* 30/11/2010
DE 1.46* 22/4/2010 2.07* 12/10/2011 1.86* 26/9/2008 1.42* 26/9/2008 2.01* 26/9/2008
1.40* 25/10/2011 1.90* 15/5/2013 2.83* 26/2/2010
ES 2.01* 8/11/2011 2.56* 15/11/2011 2.58* 9/11/2011 2.82* 6/4/2010
2.13* 7/8/2015 1.85* 22/6/2015 1.92* 16/11/2011
FI 2.62* 13/11/2009 2.56* 9/1/2008 1.98* 23/4/2010 1.68* 10/9/2008 1.81* 23/4/2010
2.73* 15/11/2011 2.12* 23/4/2010 2.76* 21/10/2013 2.68* 15/5/2013 1.66* 15/5/2013
FR 2.33* 21/4/2010 2.73* 17/7/2008 2.73* 13/11/2009 2.40* 26/9/2008 2.74* 6/4/2010
2.32* 10/10/2011 2.32* 18/11/2011 2.86* 1/8/2011 2.22* 8/11/2011
GR 1.59* 9/11/2011 3.53* 10/11/2011 1.71* 9/11/2011 2.01* 8/11/2011
IE 1.59* 9/11/2011 1.90* 12/10/2010 1.57* 18/11/2011 2.56* 15/11/2011
1.56* 17/11/2011 2.13* 7/8/2015
IT 3.53* 10/11/2011 1.90* 12/10/2010 2.60* 14/11/2011 2.58* 9/11/2011
1.56* 17/11/2011 1.85* 22/6/2015
NL 2.22* 5/11/2009 2.11* 1/7/2008 2.95* 23/1/2009 1.46* 10/9/2008 1.66* 26/9/2008
1.40* 7/11/2011 3.28* 3/8/2010 2.20* 26/3/2013 1.64* 26/3/2013
PT 1.71* 9/11/2011 1.57* 18/11/2011 2.60* 14/11/2011 2.82* 6/4/2010
1.92* 16/11/2011
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 2.03* 4/1/2013 2.05* 22/11/2011 1.56* 15/9/2008 2.30* 15/9/2008
1.45* 1/2/2012 2.36* 3/1/2012
BE 1.39* 28/1/2012 2.58* 9/1/2012 1.61* 13/1/2012 2.03* 9/1/2012
DE 2.16* 13/1/2012 3.84* 16/1/2012 2.14* 15/9/2008 2.00* 18/1/2012
3.09* 13/1/2012
ES 1.44* 18/11/2011 2.11* 21/11/2011 1.65* 31/10/2011
FI 1.78* 1/10/2008 1.80* 19/1/2012 1.50* 1/12/2011 2.28* 2/1/2012 1.94* 14/11/2011
FR 4.42* 9/1/2012 3.82* 12/11/2009 2.10* 5/1/2012
4.31* 1/2/2013 2.06* 13/1/2012 2.67* 1/2/2013
GR 1.45* 11/11/2011 1.90* 14/9/2010 1.44* 18/11/2011
IE 1.45* 11/11/2011 2.98* 15/11/2011 1.92* 5/1/2012
1.82* 31/8/2015
IT 1.90* 14/9/2010 2.98* 15/11/2011 1.68* 14/11/2012 2.11* 21/11/2011
1.82* 31/8/2015 2.08* 3/9/2012
NL 2.98* 12/9/2008 1.58* 7/12/2012 2.18* 20/1/2012 2.19* 5/9/2008 1.70* 15/9/2008
1.82* 13/9/2010 2.67* 13/1/2012 2.64* 18/1/2012
PT 1.92* 5/1/2012 1.68* 14/11/2012 1.65* 31/10/2011
2.08* 3/9/2012
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A.5 Bootstrap test for contagion using GARCH filtered series
Table 11: Bootstrap test for contagion considering GIIPS as the countries of origin. This table shows p-values
from the bootstrap test for contagion according to the time dates of correlation change-points estimated with
the algorithm of Galeano and Weid (2014) based on the standardized yields–spreads. The null hypothesis
indicates no contagion between the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) bonds and the European bond (Panel A) and
CDS (Panel B) markets. The bootstrap test for contagion is based on 1000 replications.The sample period
starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South
countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 0.999 14/10/2008 0.002 10/11/2009 0.997 11/5/2009 0.999 22/10/2008 0.661 11/5/2009
0.999 30/11/2009 0.000 27/4/2010 0.000 2/4/2013 0.987 30/3/2011
BE 0.999 1/9/2009 0.912 11/11/2009 0.998 14/8/2009 0.999 5/4/2010 0.987 1/2/2010
0.000 15/11/2011 0.983 20/8/2012 0.971 19/4/2011
DE 0.999 22/10/2008 0.996 16/11/2009 0.979 26/12/2008 0.992 26/12/2008 0.990 29/12/2008
0.999 13/11/2009 0.000 26/4/2010 0.980 7/4/2010 0.999 6/4/2010 0.997 11/7/2011
0.000 28/4/2015 0.999 13/6/2011 0.999 31/5/2011
ES 0.996 16/12/2009 0.000 16/11/2010 0.109 22/10/2008 0.987 26/12/2008
0.000 22/6/2011 0.000 16/6/2011 0.891 6/6/2011
FI 0.999 13/11/2009 0.999 25/11/2009 0.998 19/1/2010 0.926 21/4/2008 0.982 19/1/2010
0.000 19/4/2010 0.989 19/5/2011 0.999 1/2/2010
FR 0.999 13/11/2009 0.000 7/4/2010 0.000 18/4/2011 0.999 7/1/2010 0.324 19/1/2010
0.981 2/4/2013 0.952 15/5/2013 0.615 27/5/2011 0.000 15/6/2011
GR 0.000 30/11/2009 0.710 23/10/2008 0.352 23/12/2009 0.000 16/12/2009
0.000 29/10/2009
IE 0.912 30/11/2009 0.813 26/4/2010 0.999 10/6/2011 0.000 16/11/2010
0.000 20/6/2011 0.000 22/6/2011
IT 0.990 23/10/2008 0.000 26/4/2010 0.999 26/12/2008 0.109 22/10/2008
0.999 29/10/2009 0.000 20/6/2011 0.997 30/5/2011 0.000 16/6/2011
NL 0.991 5/10/2009 0.995 19/9/2008 0.981 17/6/2009 0.999 30/9/2009 0.767 5/10/2009
0.000 31/3/2010 0.083 19/5/2011 0.189 31/5/2011 0.000 1/4/2013
PT 0.998 23/12/2009 0.000 10/6/2011 0.997 26/12/2008 0.987 26/12/2008
0.000 30/5/2011 0.000 6/6/2011
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 0.000 17/11/2009 0.014 30/9/2008 0.000 6/1/2009 0.001 8/12/2008 0.000 20/1/2009
0.990 17/10/2013 0.921 14/10/2013
BE 0.015 6/11/2009 0.274 18/12/2008 0.000 12/1/2009 0.000 12/1/2009 0.000 2/2/2009
0.000 22/4/2010 0.999 24/3/2015 0.000 6/5/2011 0.917 31/8/2015
DE 0.000 17/11/2009 0.000 22/12/2008 0.000 12/1/2009 0.000 29/1/2009 0.000 26/1/2009
0.999 21/1/2015 0.878 10/11/2014
ES 0.000 6/11/2009 0.001 20/10/2008 0.000 13/1/2009 0.000 19/1/2009
0.000 21/4/2010 0.000 13/6/2011 0.000 6/6/2011
FI 0.000 16/11/2009 0.026 18/12/2008 0.000 5/11/2010 0.000 11/1/2009 0.000 5/1/2009
0.998 30/3/2015 0.834 22/11/2010
FR 0.036 5/11/2009 0.042 12/11/2008 0.000 19/1/2009 0.000 12/1/2009 0.000 20/1/2009
0.999 28/4/2010 0.998 7/4/2010
GR 0.012 12/11/2009 0.003 6/11/2009 0.045 17/11/2009 0.032 6/11/2009
0.049 21/4/2010
IE 0.047 12/11/2009 0.001 19/1/2009 0.028 12/10/2008 0.000 20/10/2008
0.858 7/5/2012 0.998 5/11/2011
IT 0.000 6/11/2009 0.003 19/1/2009 0.000 18/3/2009 0.000 13/1/2009
0.416 7/5/2012 0.899 31/8/2012 0.000 13/6/2011
NL 0.019 16/11/2009 0.055 12/11/2009 0.000 12/1/2009 0.000 17/12/2008 0.000 29/12/2008
0.905 16/9/2014 0.556 7/8/2014 0.999 7/4/2010
PT 0.000 17/11/2009 0.000 12/10/2008 0.000 19/1/2009 0.000 19/1/2009
0.000 5/11/2010 0.002 18/6/2012 0.000 16/6/2011
53
Table 12: Bootstrap test for contagion considering GIIPS as the countries of origin. This table shows p-values
from the bootstrap test for contagion according to the time dates of correlation change-points estimated with
the algorithm of Galeano and Weid (2014) based on the standardized yields–spreads. The null hypothesis
indicates no contagion between the GIIPS (GR, IE, IT, PT, ES) CDS and the European bond (Panel A) and
CDS (Panel B) markets. The bootstrap test for contagion is based on 1000 replications.The sample period
starts on January 2, 2006 and ends on March 8, 2012 for Greece and on April 5, 2018 for the rest EMU South
countries.
GR
(1)
Date IE
(2)
Date IT
(3)
Date PT
(4)
Date ES
(5)
Date
Panel A : Bond Markets
AT 0.952 8/11/2011 0.955 23/4/2010 0.344 4/10/2011
BE 0.000 7/1/2011 0.000 4/1/2010 0.000 12/11/2010 0.365 15/10/2012
0.938 15/10/2012 0.593 20/4/2015
DE 0.062 7/6/2010 0.007 15/5/2010 0.000 30/9/2010
0.612 16/4/2013 0.640 25/5/2015 0.199 16/4/2013
ES 0.212 9/11/2011 0.001 20/4/2010 0.000 12/3/2009 0.512 10/11/2011
0.943 14/11/2011 0.095 10/11/2011 0.000 18/6/2012
FI 0.907 23/4/2010 0.040 7/6/2010 0.004 25/10/2010 0.010 15/9/2010
0.390 19/4/2013 0.000 15/5/2013 0.459 25/5/2015 0.000 19/4/2013
FR 0.763 6/4/2010 0.011 6/7/2010 0.006 19/11/2010 0.004 6/7/2010
0.349 8/11/2011 0.772 8/11/2011 0.452 21/4/2015 0.459 8/11/2011
GR 0.394 9/11/2011 0.610 9/11/2011 0.112 9/11/2011
IE 0.334 9/11/2011 0.261 22/1/2010 0.000 10/11/2011 0.211 20/4/2010
0.254 14/11/2011
IT 0.072 7/11/2011 0.033 22/1/2010 0.000 18/3/2009 0.000 12/3/2009
0.047 10/11/2011
NL 0.758 3/5/2010 0.000 22/7/2010 0.003 17/6/2010 0.007 3/5/2010
0.140 27/3/2013 0.206 19/4/2013 0.655 1/4/2013
PT 0.174 9/11/2011 0.141 10/11/2011 0.000 18/3/2009 0.112 10/11/2011
0.001 18/6/2012
Panel B : CDS Markets
AT 0.933 4/1/2013 0.000 11/9/2008 0.998 28/8/2008 0.000 11/9/2008
0.999 4/1/2012
BE 0.652 27/11/2009 0.995 13/1/2012 0.003 6/1/2009
0.999 16/11/2012 0.999 16/11/2012
DE 0.796 29/12/2011 0.163 6/1/2009 0.994 30/1/2012 0.999 7/12/2011
0.990 13/12/2012
ES 0.595 29/10/2010 0.195 12/11/2009
0.000 14/11/2011
FI 0.998 11/2/2010 0.520 12/11/2009 0.997 15/8/2011 0.048 12/11/2009
0.999 22/10/2012 0.998 14/11/2011
FR 0.991 21/10/2009 0.304 12/11/2009 0.316 12/11/2009 0.137 12/11/2009
0.981 13/1/2012
GR 0.880 14/9/2010
IE 0.544 29/8/2010 0.030 29/10/2010
IT 0.928 14/9/2010 0.997 12/11/2009
0.255 14/11/2011
NL 0.000 12/9/2008 0.808 4/1/2010 0.183 10/9/2008 0.803 18/9/2009 0.026 10/9/2008
0.962 13/9/2010 0.996 7/12/2012 0.999 11/12/2012
PT 0.872 29/8/2010
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